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NOTES
On the Threshold of Wainwright v. Sykes: Federal Habeas
Court Scrutiny of State Procedural Rules and Rulings
Every state prisoner who petitions for federal habeas corpus relief 1
is entitled to an independent determination by the federal courts of the
merits of his federal claim.2 When, however, the petitioner during his
state trial failed to abide by a state procedural rule for preserving error, 3 he may well find that he cannot raise his claim before a habeas
court. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 4 the United States Supreme Court
barred habeas corpus review of a claim on which the petitioner "defaulted"5 in state court. Default on a state procedural rule was treated
as an adequate and independent state ground for the state court decision, precluding review by the federal court of the federal claim.
Under the rule announced in Sykes, habeas review is available only if
1. Federal habeas corpus relief for state prisoners is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). The
statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there either is an absence
of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process
ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
Other subsections of the statute define the term "exhaustion" of state remedies, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(c) (1982), specify when the habeas court must presume that factual findings by the state
courts are correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d} (1982), and provide for the production and admission of a
record of the state proceedings in the habeas court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e), (f) (1982).
2. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). This statement holds true even when the
state courts that entered and affirmed the petitioner's conviction have heard the identical claim
on the merits. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 459 (1953); 344 U.S. at 499-500 (Frankfurter,
J., separate opinion). The power of habeas courts to review state court holdings on the merits of
federal questions is one of the few certainties in the changeable law surrounding the writ. On the
mercurial nature of habeas corpus law, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81 (noting the
"Court's historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ");
Wright, Habeas Corpus: Its History and Its Future (Book Review), 81 MICH. L. REv. 802, 810
(1983) ("[T]he single most striking fact about habeas corpus over the years has been its ability to
change.").
3. Such rules commonly require that the appellant bring his claim to the attention of the trial
court, as by a timely motion or objection. See, e.g., COLO. R. CRIM. P. 33, 51; CONN. R. SUP.
Cr. 3063; ILL. SUP. Cr. R. [ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A (1983)] 451(c). This Note does not
distinguish between judicially and statutorily created state procedural rules. Nor have the courts
distinguished the two. See, e.g., Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1363 n.4 (10th Cir. 1981).
4. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
5. A "defaulted" claim is one which was not properly raised and preserved according to state
procedural laws or rules. This Note employs the terms "defaulted" or "forfeited" rather than the
term "waived." See note 30 infra.
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the petitioner can show both "cause" for failing to comply with the
state procedural rule and "prejudice" resulting from the inability to
raise the claim. 6
In requiring a federal habeas court to determine whether it is faced
with an adequate state procedural ground for decision that properly
bars habeas review, Sykes, in effect, requires federal habeas courts to
distinguish between state court decisions based on procedure and
those based on the merits. If the source of the state court's affirmance
of the petitioner's conviction is procedural, the Sykes test applies and
review will be barred absent the requisite showing of cause and prejudice. If, on the other hand, the state court affirms on the merits of the
constitutional claim (whether or not the petitioner in fact committed
any procedural default),7 independent review by the habeas court is
appropriate.
Subsequent practice has shown the Sykes cause-and-prejudice standard, from the point of view of the petitioner, to be very difficult to
satisfy. 8 In most cases, the same procedural default that barred direct
review of a defendant's claim in state court will also bar federal collateral review. Because of this strict application and the broad scope9 of
6. 433 U.S. at 87. The Sykes Court expressly declined to explain how the cause-and-prejudice test would operate. 433 U.S. at 87.
7. When a state court has chosen to overlook a procedural default and has made a decision
on the merits, all courts are agreed that there is "no warrant • • . for guarding state procedural
rules more vigorously than the State itself does," and that the federal court may also examine the
case on its merits. Phillips v. Smith, 552 F. Supp. 653, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (citation omitted),
ajfd., 717 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984). See also Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 135 n.44 (no federal review in such cases unless state court exercises its right to
waive state procedural rule); Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87 ("[W]e deal only with contentions of federal
law which were not resolved on the merits in the state proceeding due to respondent's failure to
raise them there .•..") (emphasis added); Lockett v. Arn, 728 F.2d 266, 270 (6th Cir, 1984);
Washington v. Harris, 650 F.2d 447, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1982);
Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d lll, ll5 (6th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981).
8. In Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982), for example, the Court held that "the futility
of presenting an objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause" for failing to object
to a jury instruction. This was so even though the Ohio jury instruction on burdens of proof had
stood substantially unchanged and unchallenged for over a century before it was struck down
(after petitioner's trial) by the Ohio Supreme Court. 456 U.S. at 110-11. This holding prompted
Justice Brennan to remark that "on the Court's present view it will prove easier for a camel to go
through the eye ofa needle than for a state prisoner to show 'cause.'" 456 U.S. at 144 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). See also Wright, supra note 2, at 809 (meanings which have been given to the
terms "cause" and "prejudice" are "not comforting to prisoners.'').
More recently, however, Justice Brennan (writing for a 5-4 majority of the Court) did manage
to lead his "camel" through the needle's eye. In Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984), the Court
found "cause" for petitioner's failure to raise his Mullaney claim (see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684 (1975)) at his trial in 1969. The Court held that "where a constitutional claim is so
novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his
failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable state procedures.'' 104 S. Ct. at 2912.
Engle, in which the Court reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the failure to raise a
Mullaney claim in 1975, was distinguished on the ground that by that time the Court had decided In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), that had been interpreted by "numerous courts" to
require the prosecution to bear the burden of disproving certain affirmative defenses. 104 S. Ct.
at 2912.
9. Attempts by petitioners to limit the scope of the Sykes test have for the most part proved
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the Sykes test, petitioners often seek to avoid application of the test
entirely. When the reason for the state court's holding is even slightly
ambiguous, a petitioner may attempt to circumvent the cause-andprejudice test by claiming that the decision rested on the merits of the
claim, and not on the procedural default. He may also claim that the
state court's ruling, although resting on a procedural default, is nonetheless not "adequate" to bar federal review.
Broadly speaking, the subject of the present Note is neither the
scope of "cause" nor the meaning of "prejudice." Rather, this Note
examines specific problems which stand on the threshold of Wainwright v. Sykes. Resolution of these problems is necessary to deterunsuccessful. For example, the Court in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982), rejected petitioners' contention that the Sykes test should be limited to claims in which the constitutional
error does not affect the "truthfinding function" of trial courts. The factual context in which
Sykes itself arose was a failure to object to the admission of a confession where the defendant
allegedly had not understood his Miranda warning. The Sykes test has been applied, however, in
cases presenting a broad range of procedural defaults. Defaults held to fall within the rule have
included failures to make timely objections to the composition of a grand jury, Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); see also note 23 infra (possible limitations of Francis), to the composition of a petit jury, Haggard v. Alabama, 550 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977), to the admission of
illegally obtained evidence, United States ex rel Maxey v. Morris, 591 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 912 (1979); Johnson v. Meacham, 570 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1978); Gates v.
Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038
(1978), or the testimony of an unconfronted witness, Zeigler v. Callahan, 659 F.2d 254, 271 (1st
Cir. 1981), to the introduction of prior uncounselled convictions, Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506
(5th Cir. 1977), to the use of hearsay testimony, Fowler v. Parratt, 682 F.2d 746, 751 (8th Cir.
1982), to a prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure to testify, Runnels v. Hess, 6S3 F.2d
1359 (10th Cir. 1981); Satterfield v. Zahradnick, 572 F.2d 443, 446 (4th Cir. 1978), or on the
defendant's post-arrest silence, Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 910 (1983); Lewis v. Cardwell, 609 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1979), to jury instructions,
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1109 (5th Cir. 1982); Dietz v.
Solem, 640 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1981), failure to move for a continuance in the event ofa missing
witness that the defendant claimed was deliberately concealed by the government, Ramirez v.
Estelle, 678 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1982), failure to comply with state offer of proof rules, United
States ex rel. Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1982), and failure to raise an issue in a
state post-conviction proceeding, United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.
1982); Matias v. Oshiro, 683 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1982).
While some courts have been cautious in discerning the possible boundaries of the Sykes test,
others have been more precipitous. Compare United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d
at 441-42 (Sykes test held to apply only after comparing the procedural default at issue with that
presented in Sykes), with United States ex rel Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d at 650 ("Any procedural default is covered by the 'cause and prejudice' standard . . . .") (emphasis added). See
also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 129 ("While the nature of a constitutional claim may affect the
calculation of cause and actual prejudice, it does not alter the need to make that threshold showing.").
The standard which reigned before Sykes was much more permissive than the cause-andprejudice test. It allowed the habeas court to hear the claim unless the procedural default resulted from a deliberate bypass of state procedures. See notes 18-21 infra and accompanying
text. This deliberate-bypass standard may still apply to decisions of the sort entrusted to the
defendant himself, such as how to plead, whether to forgo the assistance of counsel or to waive a
jury, and whether to take an appeal. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91-94 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); Frazier v. Czarnetsky, 439 F. Supp. 735, 737- 38 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Goodman &
Sallett, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower Federal Courts Respond, 30 HAsrINGS L.J. 1683, 168990 (1979); Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
1050, 1067 (1978).
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mine whether a state ruling is based upon an adequate state procedural
ground, requiring application of the cause-and-prejudice test before
habeas review will be permitted. Part I analyzes the rationale for the
rule of Wainwright v. Sykes as well as its historical underpinnings.
Part II examines the treatment of state court decisions that are based
both on a defaulted claim and, in the alternative, on the merits of that
claim. This Part concludes that decisions containing such alternative
holdings should be governed by Sykes, because the concerns implicit in
the Sykes standard apply with equal force when state courts have addressed the merits of a claim as well as procedural issues. Part III
examines the proper treatment of state court decisions that affirm a
petitioner's conviction without opinion. This Note argues for a presumption in favor of habeas review in such "silent affirmance" cases.
Part IV explores the standard by which to determine if a given state
ruling, even when unambiguously procedural, constitutes a state
ground for decision that is "adequate" to preclude habeas review.
This Part concludes that a state procedural ruling is adequate to bar
habeas review if the forfeiture called for is reasonably calculated to
promote a legitimate interest of the state.

I.

UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CAUSE-AND-PREJUDICE TEST

The statutory form of the writ of habeas corpus for state prisoners
affords relief from "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States." 10 Courts today use habeas corpus expansively as a means of independent review of decisions based on federal constitutional law. 11 In its present expansive form, the proper
scope of federal habeas corpus relief has become "[t]he most controversial and friction-producing issue in the relation between the federal
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). More broadly, habeas corpus in the United States today is
said to "provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable
restraints" upon liberty. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963).
11. Although historical views of the writ differ, compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-427
(1963) (vindication of due process historically the role of habeas corpus), with Fay, 372 U.S. at
449-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (scope of habeas corpus very limited throughout most of its history), it seems clear that habeas corpus did not always serve its present expansive function as an
independent review of errors of federal constitutional law. At one time, federal collateral review
was restricted to the narrow question of whether the sentencing tribunal had jurisdiction of the
case. See, e.g., Ex parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782, 783-84 (1887); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417,
420-21 (1885). That, at least, is the question courts purported to be addressing. The meaning of
the term "jurisdiction" in this context may have been rather strained. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 45051 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Court in recent years appears to have abandoned the historical approach to resolving
habeas corpus issues which it employed in Fay. This is probably for the best, since few of the
historical issues surrounding the writ have been resolved. Moreover, as Professor Charles Allan
Wright observed, "[w]hat happened when the Normans conquered England, though very interesting in its own right, does not seem to be of much help in achieving" consensus on the proper
function of the writ in a federal system in the late twentieth century. Wright, supra note 2, at
810. For a recent comprehensive study of the historical development of habeas corpus, see W,
DUKER, A CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980).
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courts and the states." 12 This controversy has been reflected in shifting alignments and in particularly acrimonious divisions within the
Supreme Court over the last three decades. 13
In Brown v. Allen, 14 the Supreme Court definitively expanded the
scope of habeas corpus to include reconsideration of ordinary constitutional error. The habeas petitioner in Brown alleged discrimination in
the selection of grand jurors and the unconstitutional admission of certain evidence. Although the state appellate courts had heard these
same claims, and although the petitioner did not claim that the appellate process had been inadequate to determine the issues, the Court
held that the petitioner was entitled to have them redetermined by
writ of habeas corpus. 15
But in the companion case of Daniels v. Allen, 16 the Court limited
the effect of its decision in Brown by denying collateral review of a
procedurally defaulted claim. The appeal in Daniels was dismissed because the petitioner, purely from inadvertence, filed his appeal in state
court one day late. The Court held that this default barred habeas
review, stating that a contrary holding would allow habeas corpus to
be used "in lieu of an appeal," and "would subvert the entire system of
state criminal justice." 17
Ten years later, in 1963, the Court reversed itself. In Fay v. Noia 18
the Court allowed federal habeas review despite the petitioner's state
procedural default, holding that the habeas court had discretion to
12. Wright, supra note 2, at 802 (quoting 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4261, at 588 (1978)). As long as the writ was confined to
claims by state prisoners that the state court was without jurisdiction of the case, there was little
occasion for conflict between legitimate state interests in the integrity of their procedures and
substantive federal constitutional law. Presumably, when the state court was without jurisdiction,
it could claim no legitimate interest in compliance with its procedures by the petitioner. See Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 454 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., the unusually acerbic see-saw exchanges between Justices O'Connor (writing for
the Court) and Brennan (dissenting) in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 123-24 n.25, 137, 144, 148
(1982); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78 (1977) (noting the "sharp division" in the
Court over the years on habeas issues).
14. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
15. 344 U.S. at 459. The Court declared that these prior state determinations of federal
issues could be reconsidered subject to "the weight that federal practice gives to the conclusion of
a court of last resort of another jurisdiction on federal constitutional issues." 344 U.S. at 458.
See also Brown, 344 U.S. at 499-500 (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion) (such reconsideration is
authorized by the clear meaning of the federal law).
16. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
17. 344 U.S. at 484-85. Although the rather harsh application of the procedural bar in Daniels suggested an absolute rule that claims defaulted in state court would be foreclosed on habeas
review, the Daniels Court did observe that "some interference or incapacity" might excuse noncompliance with a state procedural rule. 344 U.S. at 487. The Court also noted that the North
Carolina procedural rule at issue did not, of itself, violate the Constitution, 344 U.S. at 486,
thereby suggesting that particular state rules or rulings might be held unconstitutional and therefore inadequate to bar habeas review.
18. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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deny review only where the petitioner had deliberately bypassed 19 or
had exercised "an intelligent and understanding waiver" 20 of state procedures for hearing the claim. 21
The Supreme Court largely repudiated Fay 22 fourteen years
19. 372 U.S. at 438.
20. 372 U.S. at 399.
21. 372 U.S. at 438. The petitioner in Fay, like the petitioner in Daniels, had filed his state
appeal a day late. In contrast to the Daniels Court's summary treatment of the default issue,
however, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Fay, undertook a lengthy historical analysis of
the problem. In extending the coverage of the writ to state prisoners in 1867, Judiciary Act of
Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 386, Justice Brennan argued, Congress intended also to enhance
the efficacy of the remedy. Indeed, "a remedy almost in the nature of removal . • • seems to have
been envisaged." 372 U.S. at 415 (emphasis in original). Since the federal courts had been given
such broad power by Congress, in Justice Brennan's view, the bar which the Court had raised to
review of defaulted claims in Daniels was purely prudential. Because the state's interest in "an
airtight system of forfeitures," 372 U.S. at 432, was felt to be of a lesser order than that of
alleviating substantively unconstitutional restraints, Justice Brennan and the majority held that
the state interest should yield. See 372 U.S. at 426-27, 431-32.
The Fay deliberate-bypass standard was even more permissive than it appeared on its face. A
close examination of the facts of Fay reveals that the default which occurred there was not accidental, but the result of a "grisly choice." Noia had been tried for a capital offense and had
received, not the death penalty, but a sentence of life imprisonment. Noia initially chose to "sit
content" with this sentence rather than appeal and risk electrocution upon retrial, but he belatedly changed his mind. See 372 U.S. at 439-40. There was also evidence in the record that Noia
simply did not wish to incur the expense of an appeal. Michael, The "New" Federalism and the
Burger Court's Deference to the States in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 64 I0WA L. REV. 233, 245
n.90 (1979).
22. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (rejecting "the sweeping language of Fay v.
Noia [as] going far beyond the facts of the case eliciting it").
Fay has been "virtually supplanted" by the holding in Sykes. Wright, supra note 2, at 809.
But see note 9 supra. The case continues to be relevant, however, for its salutary focusing of the
issue. The habeas statute explicitly requires, as a jurisdictional prerequisite, that the petitioner
have "exhausted" his state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1982); see note 1 supra. Before
Fay, the Court typically approached the problem of state procedural defaults as an aspect of this
statutory requirement. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 425. In Fay, the Court jettisoned this approach. See
372 U.S. at 435; 372 U.S. at 462 n.19 (Harlan, J., dissenting); note 21 supra. This has allowed
subsequent debate on these issues to focus explicitly upon prudential and policy, rather than
upon jurisdictional, concerns. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 96 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring); 433 U.S. at
100-01 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Were the problem of state procedural defaults still perceived as one of "exhaustion," the debate would necessarily center around the intent of Congress
in enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1982) (requiring exhaustion of state remedies as jurisdictional prerequisite). Because the issue of state procedural defaults and their effect on habeas
review simply did not arise as the writ was understood in 1867, see notes 11-12 supra, such
"congressional intent" could not have existed. See Hill, supra note 9, at 1058.
It continues to be important, therefore, to distinguish between cases dealing with exhaustion
issues and those dealing with defaults. This Note discusses problems of default only. The two
types of cases superficially resemble one another, but the exhaustion requirement refers only to
state remedies still open to the applicant at the time he files for federal habeas relief. Fay, 372
U.S. at 435. In an exhaustion case, just as in a default case, the habeas court will inquire whether
the state court affirmance was "on the merits" or on "procedural" grounds. The purpose of the
exhaustion inquiry, however, is to determine whether the petitioner may simply amend his state
petition and continue to seek his remedy there.
Thus, in the exhaustion context, a state disposition on "procedural" grounds refers only to
the most formalistic aspects of procedure, such as whether the petitioner named the correct party
as respondent in his state post-conviction proceeding. A state disposition "on the merits," in an
exhaustion case, means any denial of relief that is meant to be permanent, including a holding
that the claim has been lost under state procedural rules. In the former case, the petitioner may
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later,23 this time with Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court and Justice Brennan, who authored the Fay opinion, dissenting. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 24 the Court barred habeas review of a claim based
upon a defaulted objection to the admission of a confession. It said
that a failure to comply with a state procedural rule could be excused
on habeas review only if the petitioner could show both "cause" for
failing to obey the rule and "prejudice" arising from the inability to
raise the claim.25
The Court rejected the Fay deliberate-bypass standard in favor of
the stricter cause-and-prejudice test primarily to preserve "the many
interests which [a contemporaneous-objection rule] . . . serves in its
own right." 26 First, such rules facilitate the development of the record
on a constitutional claim at trial "when the recollections of the witnesses are freshest . . . ." 27 Second, a rule precluding review where
error has not been preserved by objection ensures that the judge who
observed the demeanor of witnesses will make the factual determinations essential to proper consideration of the merits of the claim. 28 Finally, a system of forfeitures serves the interest in finality of judgments
simply amend his petition for state post-conviction relief, and continue to seek his remedy there.
In the latter, the default is fatal to his claim in state courts.
In an exhaustion case, unlike in a default case, the federal court may choose to abate the
habeas action to permit the state court to clarify its prior ruling where the reason for that ruling
(procedural or otherwise) was unclear. See, e.g., Piercy v. Parratt, 579 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1978).
23. Actually, there were strong indications even before Sykes that Fay was on the wane. In
Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), the Court held that petitioner's attorney's failure to
include all grounds for challenge to the conviction in his motion for new trial despite a warning
from the state trial court judge, a default attributable solely to the attorney's mistake as to the
requirements of state procedural law, constituted a "deliberate bypass" of those procedures
under Fay. The Court in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), declined to apply Fay to
determine whether a federal prisoner had waived his right to habeas review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1982) (federal "habeas corpus"). Instead, the Court applied the standard of FED. R.
CRIM. P. 12, which bars claims not raised before trial based on defects in the institution of
criminal proceedings, absent "cause shown" for not asserting those claims. Finally, in Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), the Court applied a two-part cause-and-prejudice standard to a
defaulted constitutional claim by a state prisoner regarding the composition of a grand jury. The
cause-and-prejudice test has been associated with Sykes, more so than with Francis, perhaps
because in Francis the state procedural rule happened to be identical to the federal rule and
Francis, like Davis, was thought to be based on an analogy to FED. R. CRIM. P. 12. See, e.g.,
O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1223 (5th Cir. 1977) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("I view
Francis as sui generis, resting on particular problems raised by objections to the process of initiating prosecutions."), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
24. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
25. 433 U.S. at 87.
26. 433 U.S. at 88. Subsequent decisions have extended the cause-and-prejudice test to a
broad range of procedural defaults. See note 9 supra.
27. 433 U.S. at 88.
28. 433 U.S. at 88. In support of this consideration, it should be noted that the 1966 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provide for greater habeas court deference to factual findings by state
courts. See S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3663, 3664-65. Because state procedural rules encourage timely hearing of the factual
matters surrounding admissibility, protecting such rules in the federal courts arguably will
render those initial findings more complete and more worthy of such deference.
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and jury verdicts by increasing the probability that evidence objected
to will be excluded at trial, before any finding of guilt has been
entered. 29
None of these observations on the wisdom of procedural rules requiring timely action is particularly new. What is novel3° is that these
arguments are advanced in support of enforcing state procedural rules
infederal courts. 31 In its readiness to treat the state courts as exercising "a coordinate jurisdiction within the federal system," 32 the Court
has signalled its concern that state systems of procedural forfeitures
operate effectively, without being subverted on collateral review by a
foreign (i.e., the federal) jurisdiction.
The Sykes Court denounced the Fay standard as subverting the
enforcement of state procedural rules. The Fay rule was said to encourage "sandbagging" on the part of defense lawyers, who might intentionally forgo a valid objection, betting on a verdict of not guilty. If
the jury instead returned a guilty verdict, sandbagging lawyers could
count on reversal in a habeas proceeding and a second chance at a jury
on retrial.3 3
29. See 433 U.S. at 88-89.
30. There are other ways in which Sykes may be viewed as "novel." The decision signalled
the Court's heightened concern over the social "costs" of habeas corpus, a concern recently
expanded in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-29 (1982). See also Wright, supra note 2, at 802
("To many the 'Great Writ' ..• has lost its halo.") (footnote omitted).
Sykes also represents a movement by the Court away from addressing procedural default
issues in the language of "waiver" of constitutional rights. "Default," or "forfeiture," involves a
penalty for failure, even inadvertent failure, to pursue required procedures for implementing a
right. "Waiver" involves a conscious choice made by the person whose right is at issue. See
generally Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale far the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in
Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977). Fay, in requiring an intelligent and understanding waiver of state remedies before habeas review would be barred, 372 U.S. at 399, clearly
adopted a waiver approach. Critics of this approach argue that the attempt to explain forfeiture
rules for inadvertent defaults in terms of waiver only clouds the strict and unyieldingly participatory understanding of the term "waiver" in more appropriate contexts. CJ Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 1977) (that a defendant who failed to claim constitutional
protections at appropriate junctures at trial could be said to have "waived" those rights is "high
fiction" under traditional waiver standard); Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brieffor More
Careful Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REv. 193, 205, 209 (1977) ("rationalization" by the courts of
preclusionary penalties in terms of waiver is "unfortunate"); Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 474-76, 513-14 (1978) (rights may
be lost by waiver or by default; clarity of definition is important for analyzing which standard to
apply).
3 I. Because federal courts are to enforce state procedural rules in much the same way as they
do the federal rules, it is not surprising that the judicial standards for evaluating the effect of a
procedural default on habeas review are today the same for both state and federal prisoners. See,
e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (cause-and-prejudice test applied to federal
prisoner).
32. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88 (1977).
33. 433 U.S. at 89. The Sykes Court's argument that, under Fay, defense counsel would
resort to intentional "sandbagging" maneuvers has been criticized as factually unsound. See,
e.g., Hill, supra note 9, at 1074-75; Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation
of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1, 43-46 (1978); Note,
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Unintentionally Defaulted Constitutional Claims, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 981, 994-98 (1982); see also Sykes, 433 U.S. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[A]ny realis-
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Moreover, the refusal of habeas courts to honor state forfeiture
rules may discourage state court enforcement of the state's own procedural rules. 34 Under Fay, the Court argued, the state reviewing courts
knew that if they affirmed the defendant's conviction on procedural
grounds, the federal courts would hear the claim on the merits anyway. The federal courts would then decide the question without substantive guidance from the state courts. This situation provided the
state courts with an incentive to ignore the procedural rule. By deciding the claim on its merits despite the default, state courts hoped to
influence the decision of the case. 35
In view of these tactical considerations on the part of judges and
lawyers, the Court concluded that the Fay rule "tend[ed] to detract
from the perception of the trial of a criminal case in state court as a
decisive and portentous event." 36 Yet even under Sykes, as the remainder of this Note will illustrate, the ultimate disposition of a petitioner's claim on appeal in the state courts will often be a most
"portentous event" for determining the availability of federal habeas
review.

IL

THE ALTERNATIVE HOLDINGS PROBLEM

The Sykes decision forces habeas courts to draw a crucial distinction between cases which a state court reviews on the merits and those
that it refuses to review on procedural grounds. Where the state court
has decided a case solely on the merits of the constitutional claim,
habeas review is permitted. But where a case is decided upon procedural grounds, habeas review is precluded unless the petitioner can
show cause and prejudice. 37 Difficulty arises where a state court has
tic system of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction must be premised on the reality that the ordinary
procedural default is born of the inadvertence, negligence, inexperience, or incompetence of trial
counsel.").
34. 433 U.S. at 89.
35. Because the state courts excercise "a coordinate jurisdiction within the federal system,"
see note 32 supra and accompanying text, as that phrase is artfully developed in Sykes, the Court
is prepared to consider and to respect state courts' desires to channel the final outcomes of cases
that pass before them. The strongest justification for this solicitous attitude toward state courts
has been advanced by Professor Bator:
[W]e must try to create conditions to assure optimal performance by the state courts. Since
it is given that they will continue to play a role, we might even ask how their performance
can be improved. . . .
. . . Conscientiousness, dedication, idealism, openness, enthusiasm, willingness to listen
and to learn - all the mysterious components of the subtle art of judging well - are at least
to some extent best evoked by a sense of responsibility . . . . I can think of nothing more
subversive to the judge's inner sense of responsibility than the notion that, to the greatest
possible extent, all the important shots will be called by someone else . . . .
Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605,
624-25 (1981).
36. 433 U.S. at 90.
37. See notes 2 & 7 supra and accompanying text.
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arguably based its decision on both procedural and substantive
grounds. 38
The circuits have split over whether habeas review is precluded
where the state courts have affirmed a conviction on the basis of a
procedural default and, in the alternative, 39 on the merits. The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, along with one panel in the Fifth
Circuit, have held that Sykes bars federal habeas review when the state
court relied expressly on a procedural rule as an alternative holding. 40
The First and Ninth Circuits, and another panel of the Fifth Circuit,
have taken the opposite view, holding that where the state courts have
not relied exclusively upon a procedural default, the Sykes test does
not apply. 41 The positions of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits are less
clear. Both Circuits, however, have applied the Sykes test in cases
38. Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933
(1981).
39. One may be tempted at this juncture to make the argument that alternative holdings are
"impossible" in this context. If one of the holdings is that the claim is barred due to a procedural
default, the argument proceeds, then the state court is powerless to render a holding on the
merits. This argument assumes, incorrectly, that the procedural default ruling is jurisdictional in
nature. The court is not powerless to hear the defaulted claim, it simply refuses to do so. See,
e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 301 (1983) ("[An] appeal is intitiated by filing a notice of
appeal. No other step is jurisdictional."). Nor is it convincing to say, as did the court in Dietz v.
Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 131 n.l (8th Cir. 1981), that any discussion of the merits of a claim not
raised at trial must be dicta because it would necessarily be based on the purely hypothetical
assumption that no procedural default was committed. This is at most a makeweight, since one
cannot so argue if the state court opinion happens to reverse the order of its holdings so as to
base the procedural default holding on a hypothetical assumption, le., that the claim has merit.
40. See Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984);
United States ex rel. Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel.
Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1982); Ratcliff v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 474, 475-76 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); see also Williams v. Lefevre, 576 F. Supp. 1488, 1492
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (review barred, citing Phillips, which is described as "the majority position");
Hall v. Wainwright, 565 F. Supp. 1222, 1232-33 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (review barred), ajfd. in part,
revd. in part, 733 F.2d 766 (11th Cir. 1984).
41. See Jackson v. Amaral, 729 F.2d 41, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1984); Thompson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d
996 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983); Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294,
1296 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1188 (11th Cir. 1982)
(citing with approval Thompson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d at 998) (Petitioner Daniel Rogers is also
known as Daniel Rodgers, and the state court cases use this latter spelling of his name. 673 F.2d
at 1186 n.1.); Lussier v. Gunter, 552 F.2d 385, 388 (1st Cir.) (decided before Sykes but after
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), and declining to apply Francis' cause-and-prejudice
test in alternative holdings context), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 (1977). Rogers has been cited,
incorrectly, as an alternative holdings case adhering to the position that review should be allowed. See Phillips v. Smith, 552 F. Supp. 653, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), ajfd., 717 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984). The state court opinions preceding Rogers rested
solely on the merits of the case; procedural issues played no part. See State v. Rodgers, 347 So.
2d 610 (Fla. 1977); Rodgers v. State, 338 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), quashed, 347 So.
2d 610 (Fla. 1977); see also State v. Rodgers, 347 So. 2d at 614 (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (dissenting justice would have grounded affirmance on procedural default).
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent Fifth Circuit decisions rendered on or
before September 30, 1981 (the last day preceding the establishment of the Eleventh Circuit,
formerly the Fifth Circuit Unit B). See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.
1981). Because separate panels of the Fifth Circuit have reached opposite results, compare
Thompson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d at 998-99 (review possible), with Ratcliff v. Estelle, 597 F.2d at
475-76 (review barred), neither the position of the Fifth Circuit nor that of the Eleventh can be
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arguably presenting alternative holdings problems. 42 This Note supports the position of the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits; habeas
review should be barred in alternative holdings cases.43
As for the procedural half of an alternative holding, the policies
cited by the Sykes court in justifying deference to valid state procedural rules are implicated whenever state courts actually rely upon a
procedural default for their rulings, even if coupled with a ruling on
the merits. 44 Federal court intervention by way of habeas review of
cases decided below by alternative holdings prevents state procedural
defaults from resulting in forfeitures, as state procedural rules normally would require. Making the enforcement of the state rule less
"airtight" in this way diminishes the incentives for making a record
upon a claim when the recollection of witnesses is freshest, 45 for allowing the trial judge to make the factual determinations that will
form the backdrop of the claim as it works its way through the
stated with certainty. Oddly enough, the Fifth Circuit panel in Thompson made no mention of
the Circuit's earlier inconsistent holding in Ratcliff.
42. In Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 128, 132 n.l (8th Cir. 1981), the court avoided the issue
by dismissing as "casual observation" and "dicta" the state court's comments on the merits of
the petitioner's claim. In Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 115-16 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981), the court similarly observed that the state court had not made "a
complete analysis" on the merits of the petitioner's claim. The Sixth Circuit said in Hockenbury
that it would apply the Sykes test in any case in which the procedural default was a "substantial
basis" of the state court's denial of the petitioner's claim. 620 F.2d at 115. See also Jackson v.
Amaral, 729 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1984) ("The greater the reliance on federal doctrine, the more
likely we are to find waiver [by the state court of the procedural rule].").
43. A similar view was adopted in Note, Beyond Wainwright v. Sykes: Expanding the Role
of the Cause-and-Prejudice Test in Federal Habeas Corpus Actions, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1360 (1984). The author concluded that the cause-and-prejudice test should be applied in alternative holdings cases if the procedural ground was dispositive of the claim. Id. at 1385.
Of course, alternative holdings ought to bar federal habeas revie:w only when the state court
has actually rendered alternative holdings. Casual comments upon the petitioner's procedural
default do not constitute the adequate and independent state ground for affirmance envisaged by
Sykes. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031, 1034 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983) (properly
refusing to apply Sykes test where state court only remarked briefly on procedural default without concluding that default had been committed or that review was precluded), vacated, 715 F.2d
502 (11th Cir.), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 1158 (1985).
The court in United States ex rel Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1982), incorrectly
treated a state court holding solely on the merits as an alternative holding. The state court said
that "[d]espite the procedural bars to the bringing of this petition, we have nevertheless elected to
consider this appeal on the merits" (emphasis added). 689 F.2d at 439. The state court seems to
have chosen not to enforce the procedural rule, and in such a case it is well established that the
habeas court need not enforce it either. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
It is difficult to imagine that anything less than a holding would justify barring hapeas review.
Thus, the approach announced by the Sixth Circuit, whereby the Sykes test will apply whenever
the procedural default formed a "substantial basis" of the state court's opinion, see note 42 supra,
does not appear helpful. By the same token, nothing more than an alternative holding should be
required to implicate the Sykes test. Cf Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d at 1034 n.4 (because
the state court's determination on the merits was the "primary basis" of its decision, Sykes does
not apply).
44. See United States ex rel Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1982); Phillips v.
Smith, 552 F. Supp. 653, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd., 717 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
s. Ct. 1287 (1984).
45. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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courts, 46 and for excluding improper evidence before it is ever admitted. 47 Thus, substantially all of the reasons that the Sykes Court said
justified the protection of state procedural rules exist in alternative
holdings cases.48
Alternative holdings cases differ from straightforward procedural
default cases, however, in that the state court has rendered an additional holding on the merits. Despite this difference, the Sykes standard should apply to bar federal habeas review absent a showing of
cause and prejudice.
Congress chose to give federal courts the final word on matters of
federal constitutional law through the power of habeas review of state
decisions. 49 The power of federal habeas review does not, however,
extend to decisions resting on adequate and independent nonfederal
grounds, whether or not other valid federal claims are present. 50 In
the presence of an adequate state law ground for decision, any meritorious federal claim that may exist alongside it is rendered moot, for
nothing can turn on its resolution. 51
Before Sykes, it was unclear whether a state procedural default ruling could constitute an "adequate and independent state ground" barring habeas review. 52 Indeed, the Fay Court had declared that "the
46. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
47. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
48. This is not to say that all of the reasons supporting the Sykes standard apply with equal
force to the alternative holdings case. The "sandbagging" problem, see note 33 supra and accompanying text, is attenuated in the alternative holdings context, since Sykes remains the general
rule and the instant problem arises only where the state reviewing court has made an alternative
holding on the merits. Only a very reckless lawyer indeed would intentionally hope to rely upon
an alternative holding by the reviewing court as the basis for his sandbagging maneuver.
The Sykes Court's concern that allowing habeas review despite a state procedural default
ruling renders state courts more lax in their enforcement of procedural rules, see notes 37-38
supra and accompanying text, is also weakened in the alternative holdings context. Habeas review of alternative holdings cases would only discourage state courts from making disquisitions
on the merits of the claim when a holding could be rendered strictly on procedural grounds. The
desirability of this result is discussed at notes 60-66 infra and accompanying text.
49. Because state courts are under the same duty as federal courts to uphold the federal
Constitution, Congress could have left the enforcement of federal constitutional rights in criminal cases exclusively to the states. As was made clear in Brown v. Allen, however, Congress did
not so choose. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 499-500 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion);
see notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
50. This is commonly referred to as the "adequate state ground doctrine." The doctrine
holds that where the judgment of the state court rests on two grounds, one involving a federal
question and the other not, the federal court will not take jurisdiction. See Ward v. Board of
County Commrs., 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1920); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977).
51. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429 (1963).
52. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81-82. Because of its origins in direct review, the adequate state
ground doctrine could be viewed strictly as a function of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction (and its traditional refusal to render advisory opinions) and not applicable to habeas review
by the district courts. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 429. In Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590 (1874), a seminal case in the development of the doctrine, the Court held that the
Judiciary Act of 1789 as amended, Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385-86, did not
require the Supreme Court to review an entire case as it came up from the state courts. Even if
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adequate state ground rule is a function of the limitations of appellate
review," 53 and not of habeas review. It is significant, therefore, that in
adopting a cause-and-prejudice test, the Sykes Court did more than to
discard the Fay deliberate-bypass standard. 54 Sykes in essence rejected
the Fay Court's limitation upon the scope of the adequate state
ground doctrine, and clearly held that a procedural default ruling that
would have constituted an adequate and independent state ground on
direct review will also presumptively bar habeas review. 55 Thus,
where the habeas court discerns anywhere in the record a state court
ruling constituting an adequate state ground, it need not read any
further. 56
In alternative holdings cases, the state court has made a procedural
default ruling and a ruling on the merits. Under Sykes, a state procedural default ruling presumptively bars habeas review. Whether or
not the Sykes Court can be described as "applying" the "adequate
state ground rule" on habeas review57 is a semantic question. The important point is that consideration of the 4olding on the merits would
the state court decided the federal question incorrectly in the Court's view, "to prevent a useiess
and profitless reversal" the Court would look into the remainder of the record to see "whether
there exist other matters . . . which are sufficient to maintain the judgment of that court,
notwithstanding the error in deciding the Federal question." Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at
635. In other words, the Supreme Court, on appellate review, would not decide federal issues
when substantive state law was sufficient to sustain the judgment. Given the limited nature of the
holding, application of a similar limitation to habeas review by a district court plainly constitutes
an extension of Murdock's conception of the adequate state ground.
A still more basic difficulty in applying the adequate state ground rule to procedural default
rulings lay in the intuitive difference between procedural and substantive holdings. When a decision on the basis of substantive state law is dispositive of the case (as in Murdock), the federal
question is moot; nothing turns on its resolution. Fay, 372 U.S. at 429. But when the decision of
a state court purporting to be an adequate state ground is a ruling that the federal claim has itself
been forfeited, the very implementation of the federal right in state court is at issue. See Runnels
v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1365-66 (10th Cir. 1981) (Logan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). However adequate the state procedural ruling might be to further the state's legitimate
interest in the integrity of its procedures, the independence (or power of such a ruling to render a
federal claim moot) was doubtful. But see Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate
State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. Cr. REv. 187, 197-98 ("[The] distinction between state substantive and procedural grounds has a surface plausibility that . . . fails to
withstand analysis.").
53. 372 U.S. at 429 (emphasis in original).
54. For a brief description of the deliberate-bypass standard, see text accompanying notes 1821 supra.
55. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87 (petitioner's failure to timely object to admission of evidence
"amounted to an independent and adequate state procedural ground which would have prevented direct review here"); McCown v. Callahan, 726 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 139 (1984). This Note argues that Sykes pays deference, in the form of a cause-and-prejudice
test, only to those state procedural rules that would constitute adequate state grounds for decision on direct review. Under the Sykes regime, therefore, a determination of "adequacy" precedes any determination as to cause or prejudice. See Part IV infra.
56. Upon finding an adequate state ground, "no further examination is required." Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).
57. See Hill, supra note 9, at 1051 & n.4.
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therefore be "useless and profitless," 58 because Sykes holds that the
procedural ruling will stand alone to justify the state's custody of the
petitioner. Habeas review, therefore, ought to be barred even where
the state courts addressed an alternative holding to the merits. 59
The rule here advanced has the virtue of not interfering with the
forms of state court decisionmaking. 60 When habeas review is permitted in alternative holdings cases, state courts have a powerful incentive
simply not to comment upon the merits of a claim - an unfortunate
result. Disquisitions on the merits of constitutional claims should be
encouraged, because such consideration may be more satisfying to the
petitioner. 61 More importantly, state appellate courts may often
render alternative holdings in order to provide an alternate basis for
affirmance in the event the procedural ruling is reversed. 62 By discouraging state reviewing courts from rendering alternative rulings,
the state's judicial resources may well be taxed to a greater extent than
they normally would be, because reviewing courts would have to remand cases upon reversal for separate consideration of each possible
ground for affirmance. 6 3
58. See note 52 supra.
59. The additional arguments that have been advanced for the opposite rule are singularly
unpersuasive. One cannot logically argue, as did the petitioner in Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44,
48-49 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984), that "when a state court invites federal
intervention by ruling on the merits . . . , it manifests a judgment that the state's interest in
resolving the constitutional question outweighs its interest in finality, accuracy and trial integ•
rity" (emphasis in original). This argument only begs the question, that is whether or not state
rulings on the merits invite federal habeas review.
It might also be argued that the very language of Sykes suggests that review should be allowed in the alternative holdings situation. The Court did say that in Sykes it was dealing "only
with contentions of federal law which were not resolved on the merits in the state proceeding due
to respondent's failure to raise them there as required by state procedure." Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87
(emphasis added); see also United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440-41 (3d Cir.
1982). To argue from this statement to a rule in the alternative holdings situation, however, is to
take the Court's words out of context. All that the Court meant here is that when the state court
has chosen to ignore a procedural default and has gone on to decide the case solely on its merits,
the habeas court need not respect the state procedural rule to any greater extent than the state
court itself did. See notes 7 & 43 supra and accompanying text.
60. See United States ex rel Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1982); Hall v.
Wainwright, 565 F. Supp. 1222, 1233 (M.D. Fla. 1983), affd. in part, revd. in part, 733 F.2d 766
(1 Ith Cir. 1984).
61. See United States ex rel Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Typically, decisions on procedural grounds are not as satisfying as decisions on the merits, and it is
understandable that a court would want to show that it does not think its reliance on a procedural rule is causing any great injustice."); Wright, supra note 2, at 809 ("A rebuff to the prisoner
on procedural grounds leaves a cloud, however frivolous, over the state conviction •••• ").
62. See, e.g., Ratcliff v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868
(1979).
63. See Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Rather than encouraging adjudication of all issues in as few proceedings as possible, [petitioner's] position would prolong and
fragment the full and final disposition of state criminal cases."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287
(1984).
State appellate courts may render alternative holdings on the merits not only to provide alternate bases for affirmance in higher state courts, but also to gain input into the consideration of
the merits in case "cause" and "prejudice" are found to excuse the default infedera/ court. The
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Moreover, in some states the reviewing court must make a cursory
review of the merits so that it may determine whether a "plain error"
exception to the state's procedural rule is to be called into play. 64
State courts operating under such a requirement, if their cursory examinations were taken to be alternative holdings, 65 would find that
their procedural rulings were almost constantly bypassed on federal
collateral review. 66

Ill.

THE SILENT AFFIRMANCE PROBLEM

In many cases a habeas court is confronted with a state appellate
court's summary affirmance, without opinion, of the petitioner's conviction. In such a case, it is unclear how the habeas court ought to
determine under Sykes whether the state court rejected the petitioner's
claim on its merits or barred it for noncompliance with a state procedural rule. 67 One approach to the problem is for the district court,
presumably familiar with state practice, to make its own inquiry into
what the state court was "thinking" when it rejected the petitioner's
claim without a word. 68 Another common approach simply presumes
Sykes Court recognized this desire of state courts to channel the outcomes of cases that pass
before them, even on habeas review. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. It would seem,
therefore, that yet another consideration manifested in Sykes - the acknowledged role of state
courts in channeling even the legal issues of a case - militates for the application of the Sykes
test in alternative holdings situations.
64. See Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 116 (6th Cir: 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933
(1981).
65. Federal courts are often confused, and with good reason, as to what comments by a state
court actually constitute an alternative holding. See, e.g., note 42 supra and note 67 infra.
66. The First Circuit's decision in Jackson v. Amaral, 729 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1984), illustrates
that this danger is not merely an imagined one. There the court allowed federal habeas review
where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's only discussion of the merits of the petitioner's claim arose in the context of applying the state's "miscarriage of justice" (a form of plain
error) exception to its procedural rules. See Jackson, 729 F.2d at 44.
67. Only in the latter case will habeas review be barred absent a showing of "cause" for
failing to comply with the procedural rule and "prejudice" resulting from a forfeiture. See notes
3-7 supra and accompanying text.
68. This approach was suggested in dicta as long ago as 1953. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443,458 (1953). A clear example of its application is Tweety v. Mitchell, 682 F.2d 461 (4th Cir.
1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983), in which the court stated: "[W]e are left to speculate
whether the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the case on state procedural grounds which
would preclude federal habeas corpus review . . . or whether the court dismissed the opinion
[sic] upon consideration of the merits, in which case a review of the merits by this court will be
appropriate." 682 F.2d at 464 (footnote omitted). This approach was said to require an "inquiry
into what the Virginia Supreme Court was thinking." 682 F.2d at 464. For a somewhat more
sophisticated description of the same approach, see Preston v. Maggio, 705 F.2d 113, 116 (5th
Cir. 1983): "In this circuit, the determination of whether state procedural bars were invoked by
the state courts has been made on a case-by-case basis, upon a consideration of all the relevant
indicia." One of the "indicia" said to point to a procedural default ruling below in Maggio was
the very fact that relief was denied there, since petitioner's federal claim was so strong on the
merits that it would presumably have "won" had it been considered. 705 F.2d at 117. Thus,
under the Fifth Circuit's rulings, the greater the magnitude of the possible error in state court,
the more likely it is that the federal court will presume a procedural default and decline to review
the matter.
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that silence by a state court evinces an intent to rely upon an adequate
state procedural ground. 69
A third approach to the problem of affirmance without opinion
involves a two-step analysis. This approach has been endorsed, at
least in part, by the Supreme Court in County Court v. Allen. 10 The
Court was confronted on habeas review with an opinion of the New
York Court of Appeals that, though lengthy, was ambiguous as to the
particular claim at issue. It was, in fact, unclear whether the state
court had affirmed the petitioner's conviction on procedural or on substantive grounds. 71 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, attacked
this threshold question by assuming for the sake of argument that the
state court had been silent on the merits of the issue. 72 The opinion in
County Court, therefore, offers a pattern for habeas review of a simple
affirmance without opinion.
Faced with its hypothetical affirmance without opinion, the Court
in County Court first inquired if it could rule out entirely the possibility that the state court based its denial of relief upon a procedural
default. After examining the record and the state procedural law, the
Court concluded that the petitioner could not have committed a pro69. See, e.g., Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 51 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287
(1984); Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982); Lewis
v. Cardwell, 609 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Hearn v. Mintzes, 708 F.2d 1072, 1076
(6th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that it might apply the Martinez approach, but finding it unnecessary
to do so under the facts of this particular case). This approach is generally invoked when a
procedural default was briefed and argued before the court that affirmed without opinion. The
briefs and arguments in state court are said to show that the court was "thinking in procedural
terms." Brown v. Reid, 493 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This argument ignores the fact
that the substantive issues also were argued, and therefore the state court could just as easily
have been "thinking in substantive terms." For the state court to exercise its discretion to excuse
the default, the argument continues, is a rare and "extraordinary measure." 493 F. Supp. at 103.
Apart from the obvious assumption made here about the frequency with which state courts will
exercise their discretion to excuse defaults, this argument necessarily presumes that some clear
procedural rule must have formed the basis of the arguments in state court. When the state of
the law is unclear, however, or when the government's procedural default argument is novel or
simply unfounded, the state court may have rejected it outright, without exercising any ex•
traordinary discretion to excuse defaults.
70. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
71. The case involved a complex tangle of closely related state and federal claims. See 442
U.S. at 146, 148, 153-54; see also People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 354 N.E.2d 836, 387
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1976) (opinion of the New York Court of Appeals upholding petitioner Allen's
conviction). The petitioner claimed that a New York statutory presumption was unconstitutional as applied. The statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1967), provided that
the presence of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all
persons then occupying the vehicle. Petitioner moved for a directed verdict on the (state) ground
that, despite the statutory presumption, he had not been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of personally possessing a firearm. He did not, however, object on federal grounds to the giving
of a jury instruction based on the statute. He raised his federal claim - that a conviction based
upon this allegedly unreasonable legislative presumption deprived him of due process - only in a
post-trial motion. 442 U.S. at 144-45.
72. See 442 U.S. at 148 n.6 (proceeding on the basis of the "alleged silence" of the New York
court). However, the opinion does acknowledge that in any event the state court probably did
reach the merits of the federal question. 442 U.S. at 153.
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cedural default. 73
This inquiry constitutes the first step of the two-step analysis. If
the possibility of a procedural ruling can be excluded, 74 then the state
court must have ruled on the merits and federal habeas review may
follow. If it is possible that the state holding was procedural, the court
proceeds to the second step.
The Court in County Court suggested that if the first inquiry results in a finding that a state procedural rule does generally bar the
type of claim which the petitioner raises, a habeas court should proceed to determine whether the state law of procedure contains any
exceptions to the forfeiture rule that might have applied in the case. 75
The Court found two exceptions that might have applied to the facts
of County Court. 76 The decision thus suggests a presumption in favor
73. The Court began its first-step inquiry by noting that the state's forfeiture policy was a
"cautious" one, 442 U.S. at 150 n.8, and that New York had "no clear contemporaneous-objection policy that applie[d] in this case." 442 U.S. at 150 (footnote omitted). Keeping in mind that
the petitioner had raised his claim before the judge in a post-trial motion, the Court observed that
under New York law "protest" can be made at the time of the ruling "or at any subsequent time
when the court had an opportunity of effectively changing the same." 442 U.S. at 150 n.8 (emphasis in original). Such protest can be made "expressly or impliedly," and need not be repeated at
every stage in the disposition of the matter. 442 U.S. at 150 n.8. All of these factors, when
combined with the fact that no New York court had ever expressly refused on contemporaneousobjection grounds to consider a post-trial claim like that of the petitioner, 442 U.S. at 150, rendered it highly unlikely that the petitioner had committed a procedural default under state law at
all.
74. For example, if only the merits of the claim were briefed and argued before the state
court, the conclusion is fairly impelled that its silence indicated that it held adversely to the
petitioner on the merits of the claim. See Washington v. Harris, 650 F.2d 447, 452 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1982); see also County Court, 442 U.S. at 152 ("This omission
[to argue the procedural default in state court] surely suggests that the . . . courts were not
thinking in procedural terms when they decided the issue."). This will not occur often, since it is
usually considered wise for the prosecutor to argue in the alternative. See Martinez v. Harris,
675 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982). Errors of judgment and oversights by
prosecutors do, however, occur. See, e.g., Washington v. Harris, 650 F.2d at 452. The negative
inference - that procedural issues were argued means that the holding was likely procedural is illogical. See note 69 supra.
There may also be cases in which the decision to apply a new constitutional holding retroactively will override the possibility of a procedural default. In Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432
U.S. 233 (1977), the issue was the retroactivity of the holding in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975), that the state is constitutionally required to establish all elements of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court suggested that states could choose to insulate past
convictions from newer constitutional holdings "by enforcing the normal and valid rule that
failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error." 432 U.S. at 244 n.8. By
implication, a state may choose not to insulate past convictions in this way. See, e.g., People v.
Bailey, 21 N.Y.2d 588, 237 N.E.2d 205, 289 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1968). This is a choice that a habeas
court can respect by rejecting the possibility of a procedural default. See, e.g., Adkins v.
Bordenkircher, 517 F. Supp. 390, 396 (S.D. W. Va. 1981).
Finally, state statutes may distinguish between the appellate court's power to "affirm" a conviction on its merits and to "dismiss" an appeal for procedural reasons. See, e.g., MICH. Cr. R.
7.21 l(c)(2)-(3) (West 1985). The state court's choice of words, even in an otherwise summary
disposition of a case, may thus suggest the basis for its action. See, e.g., Hearn v. Mintzes, 708
F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (6th Cir. 1983).
75. See 442 U.S. at 151.
76. One exception allowed review of technically defaulted claims affecting "a fundamental
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of habeas jurisdiction when a state procedural rule, by reason of a recognized exception, does not clearly constitute an independent state
ground for decision. The structure of the Court's inquiry implies that
if an exception to the relevant state procedural rule might have applied, the rule standing alone will not support the inference that the
state court denied relief on a procedural ground. 77 Rather than atconstitutional right"; the other applied where a similar claim seeking similar relief was clearly
raised. 442 U.S. at 151 n.10.
11. See County Court, 442 U.S. at 151 (Court examines state procedural law for exceptions
which "might nonetheless apply"); 442 U.S. at 149 (fact of state court decision on procedural
grounds constitutes an "inference" which must be "support[ed]"); Lockett v. Am, 728 F.2d 266,
269 (6th Cir. 1984); Kreck v. Spalding, 721 F.2d 1229, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1983); Henry v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
This understanding of County Court potentially affects a substantial number of silent aflirmance cases. Although New York is one of the more permissive states procedurally, exceptions to
a strict rule of contemporaneous objection are fairly common under state law. Speaking broadly,
state courts have the power to review claims that were not raised at trial as a matter of discretion
in the interest of justice, see, e.g., People v. Jones, 81 A.D.2d 22, 44,440 N.Y.S.2d 248, 255 (App.
Div. 1981); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 470.15(3)(c) (McKinney 1983); Denzer, Practice Commentary, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15, at 578-79 (McKinney 1971), under "exceptional
circumstances," State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 69, 327 A.2d 576, 581 (1973), when those claims
relate to errors which are basic, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 563-64, 248 A.2d
301, 304 (1968), that are serious or seriously prejudicial, e.g., Brown v. Reid, 493 F. Supp. IOI,
102 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Larkin v. People, 177 Colo. 156, 161,493 P.2d 1, 3 (1972); In re Richard,
75 Wash. 2d 208, 212-23, 449 P.2d 809, 812 (1969), that are fundamental or affect substantial or
fundamental rights, e.g., Hugo v. City of Fairbanks, 658 P.2d 155, 157 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983); State v. White, 112 Ariz. 354, 354, 541 P.2d 1156, 1156 (1975); State v. Krause, 64 Hawaii
522, 523 n.2, 644 P.2d 964, 966 n.2 (1982); People v. Jackson, 84 Ill. 2d 350, 359, 418 N.E,2d
739, 743 (1981); Dow v. State, 275 A.2d 815, 821 (Me. 1971); ILL, REV. STAT. ch. ll0A,
§ 615(a) (1983), particularly when those substantial rights are intimately bound up with the defendant's right to a fair trial, e.g., People v. Mathes, 101 Ill. App. 3d 205, 212, 427 N.E.2d 1269,
1274-75 (App. Ct. 1981); People v. Jones, 81 A.D.2d 22, 44, 440 N.Y.S.2d 248, 255 (App. Div.
1981), or strike at the very heart of a state's power to conduct a trial, e.g., State v. Smith, 240 So.
2d 807, 810 (Fla. 1970); People v. Jones, 81 A.D.2d at 44, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 255, or when such
review will serve to prevent manifest injustice. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 23 Mich. App. 553,
555, 179 N.W.2d 211,212 (Ct. App. 1970); State v. Youngren, 275 Minn. 388, 391, 147 N.W.2d
370, 373 (1966).
All of the foregoing express broad, relatively standardless grants of discretion to reviewing
courts to excuse technical noncompliance with procedural rules. They are known colloquially as
"plain error exceptions," and standing alone they would appear to apply to the overwhelming
majority of claims raised on habeas review. The question arises, then, whether this second step
to the County Court approach would render virtually all silent aflinnances subject to habeas
review. The problem is more apparent than real. In applying these broad exceptions to the
forfeiture rules, state courts exhibit definite and often strict patterns as to what does and does not
constitute "plain error." These patterns mark the boundaries to the procedural law of each state,
State courts have, for example, tended to be more permissive in capital cases (or what were
formerly capital cases). See, e.g., Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1002-03 (Fla. 1977); State v.
Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 422-23, 631 P.2d 187, 204-05 (1981) (Bistline, J., concurring); Jaggers v.
Overstreet, 412 S.W.2d 238, 240-41 (Ky. 1967); State v. Charles, 3 Or. App. 172, 176-77, 469
P.2d 792, 793-94 (Ct. App. 1970); State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487, 495, 129 S.E.2d 330, 334
(1963); State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980). Other matters which some courts have
consistently held subject to review despite the absence .of objection are those which go to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, see, e.g., O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1217 n.19 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977); Kugzruk v. State, 436 P.2d 962, 963 (Alaska 1968); Dow
v. State, 275 A.2d 815, 821 (Me. 1971); Cooper v. State, 44 Md. App. 59, 63, 407 A.2d 756, 759
(Ct. Spec. App. 1979); State v. LePage, 536 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); People v.
Dunn, 59 A.D.2d 647, 398 N.Y.S.2d 299 (App. Div. 1977), or merely to venue, e.g., Mitchell v,
State, 240 Miss. 308, 311, 127 So. 2d 394, 394 (1961); Clark v. State, 230 Miss. 143, 146-47, 92
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tempting to determine whether the state court actually applied the
exception,7 8 the habeas court would presume in favor of habeas
jurisdiction.79
So. 2d 452, 453 (1957), in which the trial court can be said to have exceeded its authority,
Thomas v. State, 243 Ark. 147, 148, 418 S.W.2d 792, 793 (1967), that attack the sufficiency of
the accusatory instrument, e.g., People v. Bridges, 67 Ill. App. 2d 236, 240-41, 214 N.E.2d 539,
542 (App. Ct. 1966); Dow v. State, 275 A.2d 815, 821 (Me. 1971); State v. LePage, 536 S.W.2d
834, 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Grays v. State, 487 S.W.2d 348, 349 (fex. Crim. App. 1972), that
relate to a verdict which is palpably erroneous, e.g., DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 373 (Alaska
1970); Lechner v. State, 439 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Commonwealth v. Borges,
2 Mass. App. Ct. 869, 870, 316 N.E.2d 627, 628-29 (App. Ct. 1974), particularly where more
than one sentence has been imposed for a single act, e.g.. People v. Johnson, 47 Ill. App. 3d 60,
63, 361 N.E.2d 768, 770 (App. Ct. 1977); People v. Kitt, 54 A.D.2d 741, 387 N.Y.S.2d 659 (App.
Div. 1976), or that go to the legality of the sentence imposed, e.g., State v. Verive, 128 Ariz. 570,
579, 627 P.2d 721, 730 (Ct. App. 1981); People v. Wilbur, 50 Ill. App. 3d 65, 66, 365 N.E.2d 198,
199 (App. Ct. 1977); State v. Womack, 273 So. 2d 290-91 (La. 1973). Less commonly, state
courts have allowed review despite a technical default where the claim is that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the conviction, e.g., State v. Linhart, 649 S.W.2d 530, 531 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983), or that the defendant was mentally incompetent to stand trial, e.g., People v. Armlin, 37
N.Y.2d 167, 171, 332 N.E.2d 870, 873, 371 N.Y.S.2d 691, 695 (1975).
Where the trial court failed to instruct the jury with regard to a "critical and disputed jury
issue in the case," Williams v. State, 400 So. 2d 542, 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1149 (1983), where the record discloses actual concern on the part of the trial court
regarding the claim not raised, People v. Carlton, 81111. App. 3d 738,742,402 N.E.2d 310, 31415 (App. Ct. 1980), where a similar claim seeking similar relief was raised, People v. De Bour, 40
N.Y.2d 210, 214-15, 352 N.E.2d 562, 565-66, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (1976), where the objection
was not immediate but was closely proximate in time, People v. Brannon, 58 A.D.2d 34, 39, 394
N.Y.S.2d 974, 978 (App. Div. 1977), where the trial court was given an opportunity to change
the ruling protested, People v. Evans, 87 Ill. App. 3d 714, 716, 409 N.E.2d 562, 564 (App. Ct.
1980); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.05(2) (McKinney, 1983), as by a post-trial motion, e.g.,
People v. Devine, 98 III. App. 3d 914, 923, 424 N.E.2d 823, 830 (App. Ct. 1981), cert. denied,
458 U.S. 1109 (1982), where the matter could not reasonably have been known to the defendant
at the time of his trial, e.g., People v. Haston, 69 Cal. 2d 233,256 n.28, 444 P.2d 91, 106 n.28, 70
Cal. Rptr. 419, 434 n.28 (1968); State v. Cowans, 10 Ohio St. 2d 96, 104, 227 N.E.2d 201, 207
(1967), where the claim raises a question oflaw which the defendant could not have obviated by
an evidentiary showing at trial, People v. Rodriguez y Paz, 58 N.Y.2d 327, 336-37, 448 N.E.2d
102, 107,461 N.Y.S.2d 248,253 (1983), where the claim raises matters of urgent public concern,
Cronin v. Lindberg, 66 Ill. 2d 47, 61, 360 N.E.2d 360, 366 (1976); State v. Koonce, 89 N.J.
Super. 169, 175-76, 214 A.2d 428, 431 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965), or pertains to the proper
construction or the constitutionality of a statute under consideration, O'Berry v. Wainwright,
546 F.2d 1204, 1217 n.19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977); People v. Joyner, 57 Ill.
App. 3d 948, 952-53, 373 N.E.2d 778, 782 (App. Ct. 1978), or even in view of the seriousness of
the charge, State v. Kramer, 252 Iowa 916, 919-20, 109 N.W.2d 18, 20 (1961); State v. Nelson,
105 N.H. 184, 189-90, 196 A.2d 52, 57 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1001 (1964), some state
courts have elected not to hold the defendant to a technical default.
An objection often need not conform to technical niceties where its meaning is clear. See, e.g,
Freeman v. State, 486 P.2d 967, 980-81 (Alaska 1971); People v. Flynn, 8 III. 2d 133, 134, 133
N.E.2d 259,260 (1956); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 470.05(2) (McKinney 1983). When the trial
court refuses a tendered jury instruction, the defendant may not have to object in order to preserve the issue for review. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 470.05(2) (McKinney 1983). And
when the defendant successfully sought a ruling to have certain charges dismissed, he need not
object specifically to the court's adding another count in their stead. People v. Davis, 82 Misc.
2d 41, 42, 370 N.Y.S.2d 328, 329 (App. Term 1975).
78. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
79. The court in Henry v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 311,314 n.4 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), vacated,
103 S. Ct. 3566 (1983), applied precisely this presumption, citing County Court. Because in
Henry an established exception to the state's procedural rule in capital cases, see note 77 supra,
might well have applied, the federal court presumed that it was applied, and that the state court
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If, however, no exception to an established procedural rule could
even arguably have applied to the case at hand, 80 the habeas court,
having assured itself that it is possible that the state court holding was
procedurally based and that it is not possible that the court excused
the default, may confidently apply state law to bar review in the absence of cause or prejudice. This approach is similar to the de novo
application of state procedural law that habeas courts undertake when
a petitioner presents his claim for the first time before a habeas
court, 81 but with due allowances for the fact that a state court has
rendered a decision in the case.
The two-step approach outlined here is designed to respect the
likelihood that a petitioner's claim was in fact rejected on its merits,
thereby entitling him to have the claim reviewed again by a federal
court. The first step inquiry pinpoints those cases in which the inference that the state court decided the claim on the merits is strongest,
and permits habeas review. Cases that do not pass the second step
requirements for habeas review are those in which the opposite inference - that the state court barred the claim by reason of a default is strongest. Here the habeas court may, with some degree of assurance, apply state law to bar habeas review. The cases which remain,
those that may fall under an exception to a state procedural requirement, are those that truly are ambiguous. For these cases, a presumption applies that ensures federal courts the final word on the merits of
federal questions, 82 and that protects the petitioner's right to have federal review of a state court decision of his claim on the merits. 83
thereby reached the merits. Were it to hold otherwise, the court noted, "federal habeas review
would unjustly be denied a prisoner who has no way ofproving that the state courts did consider
the merits of his claim." 686 F.2d at 314 n.4 (emphasis added). Because the petitioner's inability
to prove the basis of the affirrnance results entirely from the state court's silence, fairness would
seem to dictate that the state, which seeks enforcement of its rule in the federal court, bear the
burden of proof in the close cases falling under this second step.
However, when the state court clearly rejected a claim on procedural grounds, and then
merely denied reargument or leave to appeal without an opinion, the petitioner should not be
entitled to any presumption in favor of habeas review. Here one can indeed feel certain that the
state court has not truly adjudicated any issue, on its merits or otherwise. See Jones v. Henderson, 580 F. Supp. 273, 276-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
80. Because the Court in County Court concluded that the petitioner had not committed a
procedural default, or ifhe had, that it might have been excused, it did not suggest what action it
might have taken had it concluded otherwise.
81. When a claim is raised for the first time before a habeas court, the state courts have not
had an opportunity to review the claim and make a ruling which federal courts would be bound
under Sykes to respect. In order to discourage petitioners from bypassing the state courts entirely in this way, habeas courts have applied the state law of procedure de novo, just as the state
courts would have applied it given the opportunity. See, e.g., Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 517 F.
Supp. 390, 395 (S.D. W. Va. 1981), ajfd., 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853
(1982). De novo review is desirable in this context because there is no possibility that a state
court rendered a holding on the merits of the petitioner's claim.
82. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
83. Cf Edwards v. Jones, 720 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1983) (Newman, J., concurring)
(expressing concern that in case where no federal judge can be "even reasonably sure" that stale
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Moreover, "if neither the state legislature nor the state courts indicate
that a federal constitutional claim is barred by some state procedural
rule, a federal court implies no disrespect for the State by entertaining
the claim." 84
The two-step analysis provides distinct advantages over other approaches that habeas courts employ. Unlike the blanket presumption
that the state court's holding was procedural, the technique outlined
here avoids placing undue weight on the unilateral assertion by the
government, on state appellate review, that the petitioner committed a
default. 85 In contrast to the approach in which the habeas court attempts to "speculate" on what the state court was "thinking," rulings
under the County Court technique do not weigh the federal prerogative of having the final word on the merits of federal questions (and the
petitioner's right to assert his claim) against what a state court "probably" did. 86 Nor will the absurd situation be presented where, for example, a mere typographical error in one of the briefs filed in the state
court can lead to confusion over what the state court was "thinking"
when it decided the case, and therefore over whether the petitioner is
affirmance rested on procedural default, majority's presumption in favor of procedural default,
see note 69 supra and accompanying text, will lead to mistaken conclusion that petitioner defaulted in state court when, in fact, affirmance below was on the merits), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
178 (1984).
84. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
In sum, "respect" for state procedural rules does not mean that habeas courts must create procedural holdings where none may in fact exist. See note 7 supra. Indeed, the second step "respects" state procedural law by acknowledging, in the cases to which the step applies, that state
courts may have exercised discretion to hear the claim.
85. One court employing the blanket presumption of default described the rule as follows:
"Where the state does not raise the issue of procedural default and the state court holding is
ambiguous, no presumption of preclusion inheres." Hall v. Wainwright, 565 F. Supp. 1222, 1234
n.15 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (emphasis added), affd. in part, revd. in part, 733 F.2d 766 (11th Cir.
1984). This way of stating that preclusion is to be presumed from the silence of the state court
clearly illustrates that the petitioner's access to federal habeas review would often be determined
by the prosecutor's unilateral decision whether or not to argue the alleged procedural default in
state court.
Although the Second Circuit recently adopted this presumption of default in silent affirmance
cases in Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982), its
decision has on occasion met with resistance. For example, based on "[his] own many years of
personal experience with New York appellate courts," District Judge Knapp refused to apply the
Martinez rule to a state prisoner's correctable procedural default in a prose post-conviction petition. Gulliver v. Dalsheim, 574 F. Supp. 111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), revd., 139 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.
1984). No such state court, Judge Knapp reasoned, would dismiss without opinion a prose
petition on the basis of a correctable default without telling the petitioner how to correct it. 574
F. Supp. at 113. And in a concurring opinion in Edwards v. Jones, 720 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1983),
Judge Newman suggested limiting the Martinez rule to cases in which the defendant in state
court failed to observe "a well-known rule of trial practice." 720 F.2d at 755 (Newman, J.,
concurring) (quoting Taylor v. Harris, 640 F.2d 1, 2 n.3 (2d Cir.), cen. denied, 452 U.S. 942
(1981)).
86. In striking this balance, the state's interest in enforcing a system of preclusionary penalties is arguably attenuated when the state fails clearly to indicate the reason for its holding. A
rule that goes unannounced presumably does little to promote the timely adjudication of constitutional claims.
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entitled to habeas review. 87
Finally, a presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction is the only
rule that encourages state courts unequivocally to state the bases for
their decisions. The federal habeas court would face a far simpler inquiry if state courts regularly made explicit, if only summary, findings
of procedural default. 88 When the state procedural law is unclear,
either because legislation and court rules fail to make it clear, or because the state courts in the same or a similar case fail to enunciate an
applicable rule, the federal courts will adopt a presumption in favor of
review. And where the state court desires to rest its ruling on an adequate state ground, the mere indication of this fact· by a "plain statement"89 will insure that the intent of that ruling will be carried out.
87. In Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 55 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982), a
typographical error in the brief which the government filed in state court created some doubt as
to whether the procedural default argument had been clearly presented, and therefore whether
that issue was "on the mind" of the state court panel when it affirmed the conviction. The
Second Circuit nevertheless applied a presumption that the state court holding had been procedurally based.
The utility of County Court for analysis of the problem of an affinnance without opinion has
apparently been lost on the Second Circuit. In Martinez, 675 F.2d at 54-55, the court chose to
apply a presumption that silence by a state court evinces an intent to rely upon an adequate state
procedural ground. This is decidedly not the approach of County Court. Moreover, in Phillips v.
Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984), the court cited
County Court in support of the view that habeas review is barred in the alternative holdings
situation. See Part II supra. Because the Court in County Court searched New York law to find
whether a procedural default had occurred - despite the existence in the state court opinion of a
ruling on the merits - the Phillips court reasoned that when there are rulings on both substantive and procedural grounds, the procedural ground will still bar review. This argument ignores
the fact that throughout most of the first part of the County Court opinion, Justice Stevens assumes, arguendo, that the New York Court of Appeals had been silent as to the merits of the
claim at issue. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
88. Hayes v. Alabama, 566 F. Supp. 108, 111 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
89. The phrase "plain statement" derives from Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476
(1983). The Court was confronted with an analogous situation on appellate review; it was unclear whether the state high court had based its decision on state or federal constitutional law.
Because an "ad hoc method of dealing with cases that involve possible adequate and independent
state grounds is antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is required when sensitive issues of
federal-state relations are involved," 103 S. Ct. at 4375, the Court applied a jurisdictional presumption. In the absence of "a 'plain statement' that a decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds," the Court will presume in favor of its own jurisdiction. 103 S. Ct. at
3476. Such a "plain statement" is clearly absent from the affinnance without opinion, and a
presumption in favor of habeas review is therefore appropriate. The approach which probes the
"thinking" of the state court in each case is just such an "ad hoc method" of dealing with cases
involving possible independent state grounds, while the two-step approach which presumes in
favor of habeas review will encourage plain statements by state courts of the reasons for their
rulings.
A more strident approach to the problem of affinnances without opinion would require a
"plain statement" that a decision rests upon a state procedural ground in order to implicate the
Sykes test. The requirement of a "plain statement" to trigger Sykes' deference toward state procedural rulings would then parallel the statutory requirement of a "written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia" of a fact-finding by a state court before the
habeas court will be required to defer to that finding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). See S. REP.
No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3663, 366465.
Short of a "plain statement" requirement, which would in essence eliminate the problem of
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THE ADEQUACY PROBLEM

Sykes held, in essence, that an unambiguous90 procedural default
ruling by a state court that would have constituted an adequate and
independent state ground on direct review will also presumptively bar
consideration of otherwise cognizable federal issues on habeas review. 91 Under this regime, the state court's decision of a procedural
question often determines whether the claimant will be able to raise his
substantive federal issue in any court, state or federal. 92 If the state
court, therefore, were to have the last word on the threshold procedural question, the constitutional guarantee represented by the precluded claim would have only as much force as the state courts were
willing to allow it. 9 3
A system that allowed state courts to foreclose access to the vindication of federal constitutional rights by interposing unreviewable
state grounds for decision would clearly be unacceptable.94 In its unwavering assertion that an adequate state procedural rule may properly bar the consideration of a federal claim, 95 the Court has
acknowledged that some form of federal review of state procedural
affirmances without opinion, the steps advocated in the text will accomplish much the same
results in a less intrusive way. The "plain statement" required by Long, moreover, may only
reflect a pragmatic understanding of the infrequency with which the interpretation of state constitutions differs from the federal. See generally Sandalow, supra note 52, at 201-02 (decisions
interpreting state constitutions often mirror Supreme Court's interpretation of similar clauses in,
the federal Constitution). State procedural rules, on the other hand, often conflict· with the
assertion of federal rights. Cf. Note, supra note 43, at 1385-86 (suggesting a requirement for a
"plain statement" that the procedural ground in an alternative holdings case is dispositive before
the Sykes cause-and-prejudice rule will apply).
90. The present Part of this Note deals with unambiguous default rulings which may nonetheless stand or fall as a bar to habeas review depending upon some federal determination as to
their adequacy. This distinguishes Part IV from Parts II and III, in which the procedural rulings
discussed were in some sense ambiguous. The procedural rulings examined in Part II were problematic because they were accompanied by holdings upon the merits of the claim. In Part III,
the problem was to discern under which circumstances an affirmance without opinion could be
considered a reasonably unambiguous procedural default ruling.
91. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78-79, 81-82, 86-87 (1977); text at notes 52-55
supra.
92. See text at note 8 supra. Thus, tying the federal court's enforcement obligations to the
preclusionary rulings of state courts creates a "double or nothing" effect; either both courts are
free to address a claim or neither is. Brilmayer, State Forfeiture Rules and Federal Review of
State Criminal Convictions, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 741, 746 (1982).
93. Hill, supra note 9, at 1082. See also Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 319 (1958)
(states cannot limit the guarantees of the federal Constitution).
94. Such a system would, de facto, give state courts the final word on matters of federal
constitutional law. Yet Congress chose to vest this power in the federal courts. See note 49 supra
and accompanying text; Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 550 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[T]he federal courts are the ultimate arbiters of federal constitutional rights . . . .");
Sandalow, supra note 52, at 189 ("If the Court did not . . . encroach upon the function of state
courts to declare state law, vindication of federal rights would be subject to impermissible interference by a decision upon state grounds •...").
95. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 148 (1979); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
78-79 (1977); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953):
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rulings is necessary before they can be accorded the deference manifested by a cause-and-prejudice test. The necessity of federal review is
particularly acute where, as is usual, 96 the state court is vested with
discretion97 to forgive a default despite technical noncompliance with
a procedural rule. 98 This discretionary power to hear (or, conversely,
not to hear) federal claims despite a default creates a special danger
that those claims may be undervalued or even rejected in a discriminatory fashion. 99
It is clear, then, that the issue of when state procedural defaults
can preclude consideration of a federal question in federal court is itself a federal question. 100 Sykes holds, as a matter of federal law, that
noncompliance with an adequate state procedural rule will only be excused by a showing of cause and prejudice. And because Sykes mandates such deference only to those rules which, because of the many
interests they serve in their own right, 101 would have constituted adequate state grounds for decision on direct review, the habeas court
must also make a preliminary 102 determination whether the state pro96. See note 119 infra and accompanying text.
97. Even when the court's exercise of discretion would constitute an act of grace, as when the
legislature could bar discretion outright, the decision to preclude a federal claim may be "inadequate" to bar habeas review. If a state decides to grant discretion, it must be exercised in an
"adequate" manner. The situation is analogous to the state's provision of channels of appellate
review. While appellate review by the states is not required under the federal Constitution, Jones
v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983), "once established, these avenues must be kept free of
unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts." Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966). See also Hill, supra note 9, at 1084 n.182 {adequacy of state
court's exercise of discretion over federal claims is subject to review by the Supreme Court).
98. Such grants of discretionary power to reviewing courts are commonly referred to as
"plain error exceptions." These allow a reviewing court to notice errors appearing on the record
even though they were not properly raised at trial. See note 77 supra.
99. The danger of discrimination against federal claims cannot be considered a thing of the
past. In an era in which the vindication of federal rights is often perceived, by federal as well as
state officers, as setting free "clearly guilty people . . . to continue to plunder the innocent citizenry," Letter from Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General of the United States, to the
Editor (Dec. 6, 1982), N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1982, at A34, col. 3 {discussing the exclusionary
rule), there exist strong pressures, in both state and federal courts, to undervalue those rights.
The "redundancy" of habeas review of state court holdings is often thought to reduce the likelihood that the rights of any given petitioner will be undervalued. In order to make such a deprivation felt, courts in both coordinate, but nonetheless competitive, systems would have to concur
in such a result.
100. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965). See also Staub v. City of Baxley, 355
U.S. 313, 318 {1958) (sufficiency of pleadings based on this federal law is a federal question);
Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571, 574 (1948) (same); Brilmayer, supra note 92, at 742 (same).
101. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
102. As its title suggests, this Note takes the position that the adequacy inquiry stands on the
threshold of (le., is preliminary to) the application of the cause-and-prejudice test. Most courts
and observers confronting the issue have understood the inquiry in this way. See, e.g., Spencer v.
Zant, 715 F.2d 1562, 1571 {11th Cir. 1983) ("[B]asic principles of due process and federal
supremacy dictate that, before deferring to state interpretations of state procedural rules that
result in forfeiture of a federal claim, the federal court should first determine that the state rule
and its interpretation are 'independent and adequate.'") (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 87 {1977)); Breest v. Perrin, 655 F.2d 1, 2 n.l (1st Cir. 1981) {adequacy an issue "that must
be considered before deciding the effect of Wainwright v. Sykes"); St. John v. Estelle, 563 F.2d
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cedural ruling advanced would prima facie have been "adequate" to
bar further review.
It remains unclear, however, how the federal habeas court is to
determine adequacy. The few courts and commentators who have
confronted the issue, both on direct and on habeas review, suggest several approaches. One method formerly used by some federal courts to
determine adequacy applied federal plain error doctrine 103 for the benefit of state prisoners. 104 Another approach that found favor for a
time was a de novo application of state standards. 105 This approach
viewed the adequacy inquiry as a form of original application of state
standards of discretion. 106 Both of these methods have since been re168, 172 (5th Cir. 1977) (fjoftat, J., dissenting); Goodman & Sallett, supra note 9, at 1690. But
see Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1614 (5th ed.
1980); Hill, supra note 9, at 1059-88 (treating adequacy under the general rubric of "cause").
"Cause" and "adequacy" are indeed separate concepts. The adequate state ground doctrine has
its origins in the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, see note 52
supra, where it has long existed completely apart from the collateral review concept now known
as "cause." The idea of"cause" derives from FED. R. CRIM. P. 12, which requires certain claims
to be raised before trial absent "cause shown." See note 23 supra. In the rule 12 context,
"cause" has meant, in accord with common usage, some form of excuse for noncompliance with
the rule. See, e.g., United States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1982) (claim that government failed to furnish trial counsel with copy of affidavit upon which allegedly unlawful search
was based). In other words, cause exists under rule 12 under those exceptional circumstances in
which a court refuses to penalize a criminal defendant for the ignorance or inadvertence of his
attorney. See United States v. Hall, 565 F.2d 917, 920 (5th Cir. 1978); Buono v. United States,
126 F. Supp. 644, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Cause under Sykes, therefore, typically involves an
assertion that trial counsel lacked knowledge or notice of the grounds for objection. See, e.g.,
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982) (claim that trial counsel could not have known that jury
instructions were defective); Graham v. Mabry, 645 F.2d 603, 607 (8th Cir. 1981) (if counsel had
been unaware of defendant's previous connection with juror, cause might have been shown); see
also Tyler v. Phelps, 643 F.2d 1095, 1101 (5th Cir. 1981) (in absence of explanation from trial
counsel for failure to make objection, cause under Sykes will not be found), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
935 (1982). It is difficult to fathom, then, how an "adequacy" claim, le., a claim that a state
forfeiture rule unduly burdens federal rights, can be deemed "cause" for failing to comply with
the rule.
103. Every federal court considering the claims of a federal prisoner has discretion to notice
"[p]Jain errors or defects affecting substantial rights . . . although they were not brought to the
attention of the court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
104. The result of such an approach would be to allow habeas review of claims which,
although forfeited under state standards of discretion, would constitute plain error under the
federal formulation of that exception. Justice White first suggested applying the federal standard
in his concurrence in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 99 (1977). For applications of federal
plain error doctrine on habeas review, see, e.g., Cook v. Bordenkircher, 602 F.2d 117, 119 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936 (1979); Berrier v. Egeler, 583 F.2d 515, 522 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); United States ex rel Floyd v. Wardens, Pontiac & Joliet Correctional Centers, 480 F. Supp. 232, 235 (N.D. Ill. 1979). But see Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d
111, 114 (6th Cir. 1980) (denying that Sixth Circuit had ever allowed habeas review based solely
upon an independent federal analysis of plain error), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981).
105. See, e.g., Brewer v. Overberg, 624 F.2d 51, 53 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1085 (1981); Krzeminski v. Perini, 614 F.2d 121, 123 n.2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 866
(1980); Cook v. Bordenkircher, 602 F.2d 117, 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936 (1979);
Berrier v. Egeler, 583 F.2d 515, 522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
106. State formulations of plain error doctrine are often narrower than that embodied in the
federal rule. See, e.g., State v. Morrill, 127 Vt. 506, 511, 253 A.2d 142, 145 (1969) (reviewing
court has discretion to excuse a default only in "one of those rare and extraordinary cases where
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jected by the Court 107 on the ground that the states are entitled to
apply and interpret their own plain error rules. 108
The remaining approaches to determining the adequacy of state
procedural rulings draw, quite plausibly, on adequacy doctrine as it
has developed in the context of direct review. The adequate state
ground doctrine has its very origins in problems of direct review, 109
and courts and commentators historically have drawn analogies between the treatment of defaulted claims in the habeas and direct review settings. 110 Such analogies are particularly apposite at the
present time because Sykes restricted habeas review of defaulted
claims, at least in part, precisely in order to parallel the treatment of
such claims on direct review. 111 Most significantly, the Sykes Court
a glaring error occurred during the trial and was so grave and serious that it strikes at the very
heart of the respondent's constitutional rights").
107. The Court, with Justice White in the majority, recently dismissed the federal plain error
approach as flatly inconsistent with Sykes. In the Court's view, the appropriate context for fed•
eral plain error inquiry is on direct review offederal convictions by federal courts. See Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982). The Sykes test was itself established because review of state
convictions "entail[s] greater finality problems and special comity concerns" which are not pres•
ent on direct review of federal convictions. 456 U.S. at 134. The burden of justifying habeas
review is, therefore, greater than that required to show plain error under the federal standard,
456 U.S. at 134-35. It consists of demonstrating cause and prejudice.
The Court also rejected the de novo application by federal courts of state standards of discretion, remarking that "we should not rely upon a state plain error rule when the State has refused
to apply that rule to the very sort of claim at issue." 456 U.S. at 135 n.44. Accord McKinney v.
Estelle, 657 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982); Guichard v. Smith, 517
F. Supp. 942 (E.D.N.Y.), ajfd., 681 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1981); Young v. Sams, 510 F. Supp. 141
(E.D.N.C.), dismissed, 679 F.2d 892 (4th Cir. 1981); Serrano v. Duckworth, 525 F. Supp. 9
(N.D. Ind. 1979).
108. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 n.44 (1982).
109. See note 52 supra.
110. In 1959, Professor Henry Hart suggested that state grounds adequate to prevent the
Supreme Court from hearing a claim on direct review ought also to bar the claim on habeas
review. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 118-19 (1959).
Four years later, the Fay Court rejected that suggestion, holding instead that the adequate state
ground doctrine was applicable only on direct review. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
Not long after Fay was decided, Professor (now Dean) Sandalow observed that an anomaly had
arisen in the availability of federal review of defaulted claims. Even when a given procedural
ruling was adequate to bar review by the Supreme Court in its appellate capacity, review could be
had collaterally in any of the dozens of federal district courts. Sandalow, supra note 52, at 23031. This led Sandalow to read Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), see text at notes 132-36
infra, as establishing parity between forfeiture standards at some "intermediate position" between the permissive approach of Fay v. Noia and what he viewed as the unnecessarily strict
approach embodied in traditional adequate state ground doctrine. See Sandalow, supra note 52,
at 235-38. For the suggestion that standards of direct and collateral review should be the same
because review by federal habeas courts today serves as a de facto substitute for direct review by
an overburdened Supreme Court, see Michael, supra note 21, at 264 n.233, 269.
111. Professor Hill, supra note 9, makes this observation most trenchantly. He begins with
the example of a defaulted claim by a federal prisoner. It is clear, in Hill's view, that because
Congress intended the prisoner's default to be fatal (absent cause shown) on direct review, as
provided in FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2), it could not have intended the rule to be circumvented by
reviving the claim on collateral review. See id. at 1060. The Court said as much in Davis v.
United States, 411 U.S. 233, 242 (1973). Because no orderly set of rules, state or federal, can
exist without a system of sanctions, Hill, supra note 9, at 1074, and because there is nothing to
suggest that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982), quoted at note 1 supra, contemplates differential treatment
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has in effect directed habeas courts to determine adequacy by inquiring
whether the state ground for decision would have been upheld on direct review. 112
The most radical approach to the adequacy inquiry would hold
that when the state court has discretion to excuse a default but does
not exercise that discretion, the state court ruling that the claim is
barred cannot constitute an adequate state ground to preclude habeas
review. 113 When a state court decides not to exercise its discretion to
excuse a default, the proposition begins, it makes an implicit decision
on the relative substantiality of the claim. Had the claim been considered substantial enough to rise to the level of "plain error," however
the state defines that term, the state court would have exercised its
discretion to hear the claim under the state's plain error exception. 114
Because this assessment of the substantiality of the claim is an implicit
holding on the merits, 115 the argument continues, it is proper to treat
for state prisoners and federal prisoners, see Hill, supra note 9, at 1051, 1065, defaults should not
be forgiven in the collateral proceeding in the face of a federal or state procedural rule that seeks
to render the default fatal for all purposes. Id. at 1065; see also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.
536, 541-42 (1976) (comity requires federal habeas courts not to differentiate between federal and
state criminal convictions). Because Sykes was designed to avoid this "flow-through" between
direct and collateral review in this way, analysis of the adequacy problem can proceed on the
basis not only of analogy, but of actual parity between the two review settings.
112. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977); note 55 supra. It is rather curious that
under Sykes, federal district courts are directed to conduct an inquiry that had been the exclusive
province of the Supreme Court. However, the Court's decision to defend the result in Sykes by
viewing the procedural default problem on habeas review as at least analogous to the adequate
state ground doctrine on direct review made this circumstance inevitable.
113. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1969) (direct review);
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 455-57 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (direct review); Tweety
v. Mitchell, 682 F.2d 461,466 (4th Cir. 1982) (Mumaghan, J., dissenting) (habeas), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1013 (1983); Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107, 1111 n.4 (9th Cir.) (habeas), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 922 (1980); Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 705-06 (4th Cir. 1978) (habeas).
114. A "plain error exception" is a broad grant of discretionary power to a reviewing court
to notice errors appearing on the record which were not raised at trial. While the formulation of
the exception varies among jurisdictions, see notes 103 & 106 supra, its application always involves an assessment of the substantiality of the claim. See the plain error exceptions listed at
note 77 supra (discretion to notice errors which are "basic," "fundamental," or "affect substantial rights").
115. State court determinations that a claim constitutes harmless error have always been
considered holdings on the merits. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) defines "harmless error" as the
obverse of plain error - that is, as an error or defect which does not affect substantial rights. Cf.
note 103 supra ("plain error" defined). Because habeas courts commonly review harmless error
determinations as holdings on the merits, see, e.g., Edwards v. Jones, 720 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir.
1983) (Newman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 178 (1984); Thompson v. Estelle, 642
F.2d 996 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981); Lussier v. Gunter, 552 F.2d 385, 388 (1st Cir.) ("[T]he [state
court] decided the substance of [the petitioner's] constitutional claim. It characterized the [alleged error] as 'not so prejudicial as to justify reversal.'"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 (1977), they
ought also to review the plain error determinations implicit in state procedural default rulings.
Federal review of state harmless error determinations reflects the intuition that what may appear
insubstantial to a state court may be considered substantial by a federal court. Cf. Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946) (appellate review of harmless error determinations necessary because the error may indeed be serious). The same intuition can be said to apply to implicit
plain error judgments. But see note 124 infra.
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it as such. Holdings on the merits of a claim are independently reviewable by the habeas court, whether or not a default has in fact been
committed. 116 Habeas review, therefore, is in order. It may be urged
further that the very existence of discretionary power to forgive the
default suggests that no vital interest is at stake. "If some deviations
from regular procedure can be tolerated, a few more can hardly be
seriously disruptive."t 17
Appealing as the simplicity and symmetry of this sweeping exception to the Sykes test may be, it surely could not have been contemplated by the Sykes Court. 118 Such an "exception" would swallow the
Sykes test entirely, since most, if not all, state procedural rules contain
some provision for discretionary forgiveness of defaults. 119 Under
such an approach, nothing that a state court could do would insure the
enforcement of a procedural rule on collateral review. Every decision
seeking to enforce a procedural rule where discretion was theoretically
permissible would be subject to unbridled habeas review.
The reasoning behind this approach, moreover, is not very convincing. The mere existence of discretion to excuse technical defaults
in compliance with state procedural law does not indicate that no vital
state interest is at stake. The habeas court must examine state procedural law to determine whether there has been a default; it should not
matter, for purposes of determining the adequacy of a ruling to bar
habeas review, whether that law comes from the legislature or through
the discretion of state courts. Discretion, when it consists of "reasoned elaboration" according to known principles, "is nothing more
than the judicial formulation of law." 120 That state courts participate
in the delineation of their own powers by the primary means available
to them, namely discretion, cannot gainsay the fact that the lines thus
drawn constitute the procedural law of the state. Even under the permissive Fay standard, state procedural law could not simply be
ignored. 121
I 16. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
117. Sandalow, supra note 52, at 225.
118. Cf. Brown v. Reid, 493 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (mere fact that state appellate courts may exercise discretion to excuse default does not make Sykes inapplicable). The
Court might have applied, but implicitly rejected, this approach in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
125 n.27 (1982).
119. See Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
933 (1981); Hill, supra note 9, at 1086.
120. Sandalow, supra note 52, at 226. Sandalow distinguishes this sort of exercise-of discre•
tion from "a power of continuing discretion," which connotes "ad hocness." Id. (citing H. HART
& A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OP
LAW 161, 168-79 (tent. ed. 1958)). This Note has argued previously that the discretion repre•
sented by state plain error exceptions manifests "reasoned elaboration" according to established
patterns and principles. See note 77 supra.
121. Under Fay, state forfeiture rules were enforced only when the petitioner had deliberately bypassed state procedures for raising his claim. See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying
text.
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Moreover, all that has "implicitly" been determined by a state
court that declines to hear a claim is that the facts of the claim do not
warrant forgiveness under the applicable state standard, however that
standard happens to be formulated. 122 Thus, the fact that a claim is
held not to rise to the level of a state law standard of discretion is
simply irrelevant to whether such a ruling is adequate under a federal
standard. 123 Finally, a state court's refusal to hear a claim does not
mean that it necessarily assessed the substantiality of the claim and
found it wanting. A state court, under its plain error exception, may
hear claims which constitute plain error. It is not required to do so. 124
Courts may also determine adequacy by reviewing a particular denial of a federal claim for consistency with prior state denials. Inconsistency with other decisions may indicate discriminatory application
of a state procedural rule. No one disputes that if a state court were to
make a ruling which actually discriminated against the assertion of
federal claims, that ruling would be inadequate to bar those claims. 125
But the habeas court must surely go beyond inquiring whether the
state court actually acted with discriminatory intent. Proof that a
state court acted with "bad" intent is both difficult to come by 126 and
unseemly to search for and proclaim. 127 The adequacy inquiry may,
122. See notes 106 & 114 supra (formulations of discretionary power to excuse defaults vary
among jurisdictions).
123. See Hill, supra note 9, at 1086 n.191.
124. The seductive argument that a plain error ruling, like a harmless error ruling, is an
implicit holding on the merits, see note 115 supra, is also of questionable validity. There are
distinctions between plain and harmless error. When a court decides that a claim does not constitute plain error, it generally poses itself a hypothetical question: if the allegations contained in
the petition were true, would plain error exist under the applicable state standard? If not, the
reviewing court will not assert jurisdiction. On the other hand, a court will more often assert
jurisdiction and conclude that a claim does in fact have merit before it proceeds to find that the
error is harmless. Only in the latter case has the state court asserted jurisdiction, considered the
claim on its merits, found it to contain merit, and denied relief. Only in the latter case, therefore,
is an independent federal determination on the merits clearly in order. See notes 2 & 7 supra and
accompanying text. Moreover, despite its formal definition, see note 115 supra, harmless error
involves a pragmatic inquiry as to whether the determination of guilt by the trier of fact would
have resulted differently had the error not occurred. One would not expect the method of conducting this practical weighing of the effect of error upon the trier of fact to vary among jurisdictions. How the state weighs an error's likely effect on the outcome of a trial would thus seem a
more reliable and relevant indicator of the importance accorded the right than its correspondence to variable state standards of plain error.
125. See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text; Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 383
(1955); Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Commn., 274 U.S. 651, 657 (1927); Sandalow, supra
note 52, at 196. Indeed, one strongly suspects that in those cases which suggested an "automatic" finding of inadequacy where discretion existed under state law, see note 113 supra and
accompanying text, the Court in fact believed that the state ground in a civil rights case had been
administered discriminatorily. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), for
example, the Virginia state courts had precluded the petitioner's claims that the respondent's
lease provision was racially discriminatory and constituted a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1982).
126. See Hill, supra note 9, at 1085; Sandalow, supra note 52, at 219-20. Moreover, the state
court may undervalue a federal claim inadvertently. See note 99 supra.
127. See generally Hill, supra note 9, at 1084 n.182 ("[W]hat has characterized Supreme
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therefore, proceed on the basis of indicia of discriminatory application,
particularly whether the nonfederal ground put forth by the state
courts is inconsistent with earlier state court decisions. 128
Reviewing a state ruling for consistency and correctness under
state law might appear to be the proper approach for determining the
adequacy of a state procedural ruling. The habeas court would act "as
if it were the highest court of the state, considering the issue of state
law," 129 and strike down as a bar to habeas review only those rulings
which were clearly erroneous under state law. However, neither state
court review nor federal court review after the fashion of a state court
will substitute for federal review of what remains a federal question.
The very existence of the power to review state judgments illustrates
that the highest state court's views will not always be motivated by the
same considerations as those of the federal court. 130 More significantly, consistency with past decisions says little about a ruling's adequacy. State procedural rulings may consistently have been
"inadequate" to bar federal review. Further, "[a] federal right may be
avoided by state grounds that lack a foundation in the record as well
as by those that depart from earlier law." 131 Thus, the federal standard of review of the adequacy of state procedural rulings must scrutinize the state ruling more thoroughly than an inquiry that merely
examines the consistency of that ruling with past state precedent.
The most appropriate standard for determining adequacy requires
a demonstration that the forfeiture called for is reasonably calculated
to promote a legitimate interest of the state. The adequate state
ground case of Henry v. Mississippi 132 provides important guidance for
the content of this more thoroughgoing standard for determining adequacy. In Henry, the defendant failed to object upon the introduction
into evidence of the fruits of an allegedly unlawful search. Instead,
defendant's counsel included the objection in a motion for directed
verdict at the close of the state's case. The state supreme court held
Court practice from the start, so far as concerns examination of the state ground for adequacy, is
that inquiry into the motivation of the state court is rigorously avoided •.. ,"),
128. See, e.g., Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964); Wright v. Georgia, 373
U.S. 284, 291 (1963); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 320 (1958); Fox River Paper Co. v.
Railroad Commn., 274 U.S. 651, 656 (1927).
129. Hill, supra note 9, at 1083 (emphasis in original) (describing pre-1965 adequacy doctrine
in the Supreme Court); see also Note, The Untenable Nonfedera/ Ground in the Supreme Court,
74 HARV. L. REv. 1375, 1393 (1961) (federalism concerns exist whenever the Supreme Court
reviews state court decisions).
130. Professor Sandalow expressed this thought best when he observed that "[t]he Court's
power to declare the state ground inadequate exploits the institutional differences between it and
the state courts to assure that in the accommodation of state and federal interests appropriate
recognition will be given to the latter." Sandalow, supra note 52, at 218.
131. Sandalow, supra note 52, at 227. See also Ward v. Board of County Commrs., 253 U.S.
17, 22-23 (1920) (Supreme Court review not precluded if the nonfederal grounds for the decision
are without fair and substantial support).
132. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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the claim barred on procedural grounds. On direct review, in dicta, 133
the Supreme Court suggested that "a litigant's procedural defaults in
state proceedings do not prevent vindication of his federal rights unless the State's insistence on compliance with its procedural rule serves
a legitimate state interest." 134 The Court went on to suggest that the
delay in presenting the objection until the close of the prosecution's
case did not frustrate the state's legitimate "interest in avoiding delay
and waste of time," 135 presumably because the trial judge was still afforded ample opportunity to consider the alleged error. If this were
so, the Court observed, and if upholding the forfeiture "would serve
no substantial state interest," then the procedural ruling could not be
treated as adequate to bar the assertion of "important" federal
rights.136
Although the continued vitality of Henry v. Mississippi has been
questioned by commentators of late, 137 the dicta for which it has be133. The Court remanded the case for a hearing as to whether the defendant had knowingly
waived his right to raise his claim in a timely manner. This result clearly echoes with the Fay
deliberate-bypass standard for habeas review, see text at notes 18-21 supra, and its application
here on direct review renders the actual disposition of this case something of an historical
curiosity.
134. 379 U.S. at 447.
135. 379 U.S. at 448-49.
136. 379 U.S. at 448-49.
137. See, e.g., Goodman & Sallett, supra note 9, at 1692 n.40; Hill, supra note 9, at 1051
("Henry is . . . dead, or nearly so." (footnote omitted)); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO &
H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 55862 (2d ed. 1973). One suspects that these misgivings arise partly from the intuition, born of
experience, that an opinion authored two years after Fay v. Noia by Justice Brennan (who also
wrote for the Court in Fay) cannot long remain viable under the Burger Court. More substantially, these commentators, notably Hill, view the dicta in Henry as an aberration, unsupported
by precedent prior to Henry and not followed subsequently as authority. See Hill, supra note 9,
at 1052, 1083-84.
While the Henry dicta probably went beyond mere synthesis of prior decisions, but see Recent Developments, Federal Jurisdiction: Adequate State Grounds and Supreme Court Review, 65
COLUM. L. REv. 710, 713 (1965) (Henry is "a fair synthesis of prior decisions" (footnote omitted)), it did have significant antecedents. Under the "inconsistency" approach to adequacy the
Court held "inadequate" those state grounds that departed from prior state precedent. See note
128 supra and accompanying text. This approach reflected something more than a concern with
mere notice to defense counsel of state procedures. There was also the belief that a state rule that
is not consistently followed and is without adequate precedent likely does not serve a legitimate
state purpose. See Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964) ("We have often pointed
out that state procedural requirements which are not strictly or regularly followed cannot deprive us of the right to review."). This is so for two reasons. First, in order for many procedural
rules to serve any purpose at all, they must be known to the litigants whose behavior the state
seeks to modify. Second, if a state has consistently tolerated certain behavior in the past, one is
skeptical that some legitimate state interest has simply "sprung up" in the interim. The "inconsistency" approach, then, seeks to reveal more than mere evidence that the state court may be
discriminating against federal claims. These cases also manifest the Court's disapproval of the
arbitrariness and purposelessness of the "exaltation of form" to bar the assertion of federal
claims. See Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313,320 (1958). Professor Hill asserts that, prior to

Henry:
a forfeiture for breach of state procedure was sustained by the Supreme Court on direct
review, however technical and even burdensome the procedure might be, as long as a competent lawyer could have coped with it, and as long as the state court's disposition of the
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come best known have recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court. 138 And while the proposed application of the Henry dicta to
the facts of that case may rightfully be criticized, 139 the essence of the
Henry approach is thoroughly consistent with the treatment of other
claimed deprivations of fundamental rights. 140
The adequacy inquiry should thus be viewed as an inquiry into the
constitutionality of a claimed deprivation of fundamental federal
rights by state action. Sykes held that a state procedural ruling may
constitute an adequate and independent state ground upon which a
state court may rest its decision. 141 Thus, the procedural ruling patenprocedural point . . . was fairly predictable in light of the pertinent statutes, rules, and
precedents . . . .
Hill, supra note 9, at 1051. This assertion cannot explain the result in Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 376 U.S. 339 (1964) (per curiam). The petitioner had been convicted of interfering
with a police officer who was taking some "freedom riders" into "protective custody." See Shut•
tlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 42 Ala. App. 1, 149 So. 2d 921 (Ct. App.), cert. stricken, 274
Ala. 613, 149 So. 2d 923 (1962), revd. per curiam, 376 U.S. 339 (1964). His petition for review to
the Alabama Supreme Court was stricken because it was not filed on "transcript paper," as was
required by court rule. 149 So. 2d at 923. It can be inferred that the Supreme Court, in its per
curiam reversal of the Alabama Court of Appeals, decided that the transcript paper ruling was
inadequate to bar review of the petitioner's claim. The Court reversed despite the fact that the
Alabama ruling requiring transcript paper was supported by ample state precedent, even in cases
arising under much less politically charged circumstances. See, e.g., Cranmore v. State, 129 So.
2d 688 (Ala. 1961) (affirming burglary conviction); Ex parte Davis, 269 Ala. 58, 110 So. 2d 306
(1959) (affirming denial of rehearing of application for suspended sentence); McDonald v.
Amason, 267 Ala. 654, 104 So. 2d 719 (1958) (action for personal injury to automobile guest).
One can only conclude from this result that the Court decided, in a manner later suggested by
the Henry dicta, that the state interest in having court papers be of the same size and thickness
for filing purposes could not outweigh the defendant's right to assert his federal claim. The state
ground, therefore, was inadequate to bar review. While Professor Hill is correct in saying that
adequate notice of state rules for its own sake, and apart from any consideration of burdensome•
ness, was at times a concern, see, e.g., Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284,291 (1963), this concern
about notice in particular cases underlies, not the adequacy inquiry, but the separate inquiry now
known as "cause." See note 102 supra.
138. In James v. Kentucky, 104 S. Ct. 1830 (1984), the Court on direct review held a procedural default ruling by the Kentucky Supreme Court inadequate to bar review on the merits.
The state court had ruled that the trial judge was relieved of his obligation (when properly requested by counsel) to instruct the jury not to draw adverse inferences from the defendant's
failure to testify, see Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), because of the petitioner's procedural default: he had requested only an "admonition," not an "instruction," to this effect. The
Court held that the distinction drawn by the state court between instructions and admonitions
could not prevent review on the merits for two reasons: first, such a distinction had not consistently been drawn under prior state precedent; and second, citing Henry, because "[t]o insist on a
particular label" for defense counsel's action "would further no perceivable state interest." 104
S. Ct. at 1835.
139. The strident tone of the opinion is particularly troublesome when one considers that the
state rule belabored in Henry was more permissive than the corresponding federal rule. Hill,
supra note 9, at 1052 n.13. In applying the Henry test, a habeas court should refrain from exercising a degree of scrutiny which would allow lesser scope for the operation of state rules than for
federal rules. To intrude upon the effective functioning of state rules would undermine the primary rationale for the Sykes test. See notes 30-32 & 110 supra and accompanying text. The
Henry Court did observe, however, that it did not contemplate "a plethora of attacks" on reasonable state procedural rules. 379 U.S. at 448 n.3.
140. See notes 145-49 infra and accompanying text.
141. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
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tially stands alone to justify the state's custody of the petitioner, even
where his substantive claim if heard would mandate his release. 142 Because the writ of habeas corpus for state prisoners affords relief from
"custody in violation of the Constitution," 143 a state forfeiture ruling
that is inadequate to bar review of a federal claim and yet that purports to justify custody of the petitioner is, in essense, a forfeiture in
violation of the Constitution. 144
The Supreme Court today tests the constitutionality of governmental actions which limit the exercise of "fundamental" constitutional
rights by applying stricter forms of review, or heightened "scrutiny"
under the due process clause. 145 The Court has also implicitly recognized that the right to fairness in criminal proceedings is one such
fundamental right. 146 The scrutiny represented by the Henry formulation, 147 which would at a minimum require that state forfeitures be
justified by a legitimate state interest, can therefore be viewed as thoroughly consistent with traditional assessments of the constitutionality
of state action when that action deprives individuals of federal
rights. 148 The vindication of the right to fairness in criminal proceedings by means of habeas corpus actions is of " 'fundamental importance ... in our constitutional scheme' because [habeas petitions]
142. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982); see Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir.
1983), vacated, 715 F.2d 502 (11th Cir.), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 1158 (1985).
144. "What is due from the federal courts . . . is a fresh look at the degree to which forfeitures are sustainable under the Constitution." Hill, supra note 9, at 1059.
145. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 457 (2d ed. 1983).
146. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1971); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, supra note 145, at 460.
147. The Henry formulation of the adequacy inquiry clearly contemplates heightened constitutional scrutiny of state procedural rulings. It is unclear, however, and beyond the scope of this
Note to determine, what level of scrutiny is intended or may be appropriate. At one point in the

Henry opinion, it is suggested that a "legitimate" state interest is all that is required to justify a
deprivation of "important" federal rights. 379 U.S. at 448. In another place, the necessity of a
"substantial" state interest is mentioned. 379 U.S. at 449. The wide array of rights that can
conceivably be raised on habeas review vary in their importance, as does the substantiality of the
state's interest in upholding a broad range of forfeitures. The state's interest in avoiding burdensome reprosecution may be greater in the context of guilty pleas, for example, than in the case of
a retrial, because in the former case the state may not have marshalled evidence against a defendant soon after the offense was committed. By the time the plea is withdrawn and the case remanded, it may be too late for the state to rebuild its case. See Westen, supra note 30, at 1247-49.
This suggests that the appropriate level of scrutiny may vary depending upon the combination of
right and forfeiture presented by a particular habeas claim.
148. Professor Hill observes that Henry would force federal courts to undertake the task of
imagining "hypothetical rules that would serve the interests of the state at least as well, or 'substantially' so." Hill, supra note 9, at 1052. Hill fails to explain how the "task" set by Henry is
any more burdensome than that undertaken by federal courts faced with other allegedly unconstitutional deprivations of federal rights. Cf Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking
down classification based on illegitimacy in intestate succession statute as not substantially related to permissible state interests).
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directly protect our most valued rights." 149 Thus, treating alleged
deprivations of those rights by applying stricter forms of review is as
appropriate on habeas review as it is in other contexts.
It is too soon, in sum, to sound the death knell for Henry v. Mississippi. Discerning whether a state procedural ruling constitutes an adequate state ground for decision has today become an important issue
that determines the applicability of the Sykes test, and the wisdom of
the Henry formulation for determining the adequacy of state grounds
to bar habeas review has now become apparent to a significant number
of federal courts. 150 The revitalization of Henry is a natural result of
149. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977) (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
485 (1969)).
150. The petitioner in Gulliver v. Dalsheim, 574 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), revd., 739
F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1984), for example, made the mistake of titling his motion to reargue in state
court a "petition for habeas corpus." The state court then affirmed his conviction without opinion. District Judge Knapp held that even if the affirmance without opinion indicated that the
state court declared petitioner's error a procedural default, which Judge Knapp doubted, such a
default ruling would be inadequate to bar federal habeas review. He observed:
[I]napplicable to the case at bar is the "legitimate state interest" found by Sykes and its
progeny in various state procedural rules. . . • There is no comparable state interest in the
insistence that a paper, making cognizable claims and filed with the correct court, bear one
particular set of words at its head.
574 F. Supp. at 114.
In Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1983), the petitioner while in state court had
tried to challenge the minority composition of his petitjury. He raised the challenge during voir
dire of that jury, but the state courts held that the challenge was not timely made under a state
procedural rule requiring challenges to be made before the jury is "put upon" the defendant. 715
F.2d at 1568. Petitioner's application for habeas corpus was denied by the district court, but the
Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that Georgia's application of its procedural rule was inadequate to preclude review. The court noted that the procedural ruling was not well supported by
prior state precedent, see notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text, but went on to say that even
if it were, "Georgia's policy interests in enforcing its default rule in this case seem weak at best,"
because the trial court had been given "more than ample opportunity to correct the array without wasting judicial resources." 715 F.2d at 1573 & n.11 (citing Henry v. Mississippi).
In a thoughtful dissent in St. John v. Estelle, 563 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 914 (1978), Judge Tjoflat, with whom Judges Goldberg and Godbold joined,
asserted that Sykes:
[does] not stand for the proposition that the failure to comply with a state's contemporaneous objection rule necessarily bars full habeas review of the petitioner's constitutional claim.
Rather, it is the extent to which the state's rule is grounded on legitimate state interests and
operates in a manner consistent with a defendant's right to a fair trial that determines
whether a federal habeas court need defer to it.
563 F.2d at 172.
Dissenting in Runnel v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1366 (10th Cir. 1981), Judge Logan cited
Henry for the proposition that the state procedural rule there involved was not adequate to bar
habeas review because its enforcement would fail, under the circumstances, to promote a legitimate state interest. Since the prosecuting attorney's remarks that formed the basis of the federal
claim were "irremediably prejudicial," the state's interest in correcting errors at the trial level
was inapplicable. See also Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 705-06 (4th Cir. 1978) (differing with the state's application of its own procedural rule when objection to an irremediably
prejudicial closing statement appeared to serve no legitimate state purpose). Judge Murnaghan
made a similar point in Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055, 1069-70 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1004 (1980) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting), when he observed that "[t]he purposes of the rule
favoring deference to a state procedural requirement [were] entirely absent" where the defendant's claim was one of "general constitutional law, applicable in every case." In that situation,
the state's interest in encouraging factual exploration at the trial was said to be attenuated, and
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the establishment of the Sykes test, since both cases are informed by a
common understanding. Sykes seeks to uphold state procedural rules
for the many interests that those rules serve in their own right; where
those interests are not remotely being served, Henry would mandate,
and Sykes would permit, federal review.
This partnership between Sykes and Henry can only be maintained,
however, if the Henry approach outlined above is applied with restraint, so as not to undermine a state procedural rule where, in fact,
some rule is needed. Rules by their very nature are only imperfectly
tailored to individual cases, and Henry should not be employed as an
intrusive, post hoc veto over state rules whose routine functioning will
not allow them to apply with equal force to all petitioners. But if the
very concept of "forfeiture" can rightly be viewed as "a theoretical
model for weighing the defendant's interest in asserting defenses
against the state's interest in foreclosing them," 151 it would seem the
height of good sense and fairness to require, as would Henry, that
something be shown to weigh on the side of the state.

that interest was therefore inadequate to justify a forfeiture. Cf. Breest v. Perrin, 655 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir.) (holding that state procedural rule served a legitimate state interest, and therefore was
adequate to preclude review under Sykes), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981); Cheek v. Bates, 615
F.2d 559, 563 (1st Cir.) (observing, before applying Sykes test, that state procedural rule was
reasonably well-tailored to state's substantial interest in truth-seeking function of the trial), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 944 (1980); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1217 (5th Cir.) (applying
Henry formulation to default of fourth amendment claim before applying the Stone v. Powell
"full and fair consideration" test), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977); Holmes v. Israel, 453 F.
Supp. 864, 867 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (questioning whether Sykes should apply where state's policy to
prevent "sandbagging" by defense counsel was substantially vindicated by counsel's motion for
mistrial), ajfd., 618 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1980).
151. Westen, supra note 30, at 1260.

